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ARTICLES




During the past few years, a growing number of voters have registered or de-
scribed themselves as "independent."' They have expressed serious interest in voting
or working for independent or third-party presidential candidates.
Throughout 1995, a number of nationally-known political figures tested the wa-
ters or were urged to run as independent candidates. At the National Conference of
United We Stand, America, conducted in August, H. Ross Perot told his supporters
that he would consider another independent run for President if neither the Democratic
nor Republican parties shaped up to his satisfaction.2 He also announced that he and
his supporters had begun the process of forming a national party that could serve as a
potential vehicle for an appropriate independent candidate.3 The same month, New
Jersey Senator Bill Bradley announced that he would not seek re-election as Senator in
1996 but was considering a possible independent run for the presidency.4 Retired Gen-
* Mr. Josephson is a retired partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York,
N.Y. He received his A.B. from the University of Chicago and J.D. from Columbia University. Ms.
Ross is an Associate Professor at St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Fla. She received her
B.A. from Florida State University, J.D. from New York University, and LL.M. from Columbia Uni-
versity. The authors wish to thank Elizabeth Bartholet, Nelson W. Polsby and Albert J. Rosenthal for
their helpful comments on an earlier draft. They also thank Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Patricia Gennerich
Gillane, Warren Gordon, Larry Gould, Brian Hill, Charles L. Jacob, Lorraine Kooby-Survis, Cynthia
Martins, Annelies Mouring, Edward M. Rosenthal and Jennifer Winokur for valuable research assistance
and William Ney for invaluable editorial assistance. With others at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson, the authors represented pro bono publico the 1980 Carter-Mondale and 1988 Dukakis-Bentsen
campaigns concerning electoral college issues.
1. DAVID B. HILL & NORMAN R. LLrBERG, TRENDS IN AMERICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 32
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eral Colin L. Powell, who gained national attention during the Persian Gulf War,5 was
the subject of continuing speculation and entreaty until he announced, on November
8th, that he would not run for political office in 1996.6 Despite this announcement, in
his 1995 autobiography, My American Journey, Powell stated that "the time may be at
hand for a third major party to emerge"7 in the United States. As of March 1996, it
became clear that Republican candidate Patrick J. Buchanan would not win his party's
nomination, and he has also begun to toy with the idea of an independent campaign.'
These individuals, of course, are not the first in American history to contemplate inde-
pendent presidential campaigns.
In the early part of this century, with the exception of Theodore Roosevelt's
1912 Bull Moose campaign,9 independent presidential candidacies were largely the
province of small parties at one end or the other of the political spectrum. These par-
ties were never expected to affect the outcome of any presidential election, and none
did.' Beginning with the 1948 independent campaigns of Henry A. Wallace and Sen-
ator Strom Thurmond," a series of third-party or independent presidential candi-
dates-Governor George C. Wallace in 1968, Senator Eugene McCarthy in 1976, Sen-
ator John Anderson in 1980, and H. Ross Perot in 1992-raised concerns that the elec-
toral vote might fail to produce an immediate and decisive winner. 2
In 1912, Theodore Roosevelt's candidacy split the Republican Party, denied re-
election to the incumbent Republican President, William Howard Taft, and ultimately
led to the election of Woodrow Wilson, the first Democratic President since Grover
Cleveland. However, the effects of independent candidacies have not always been this
clear. For example, polling organizations and analysts are still arguing whether Ross
Perot's independent candidacy in 1992 took more votes from the incumbent Republi-
can President, George Bush, or whether it affected both major parties equally. 3 This
5. See Bob Woodward, The Powell Predicament, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1995, at W8.
6. The Powell Decision: Excerpts From Powell's News Conference on Political Plans, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at B13. Many factors suggested that Powell would run as an independent rather
than a Republican. First, he had long refused to commit to the Republican Party. Second, in his youth
he was a member of the Liberal Party. Third, the field of Republican candidates was already crowded.
See, e.g., Hendrick Hertzberg, The Independent Route: Would a Powell-Bradley Insurgency Be Good
For America?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 4, 1995, at 5 (urging Powell to pursue and independent run
for the presidency with Sen. Bradley, a Democrat, as his running mate).
7. R. W. Apple, Jr., In Book, Powell Says a 3d Party May Be Needed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1995, § 1, at 1.
8. James Bennett, Patrick Buchanan: An R.S.V.P. for the Dole Victory Celebration Isn't Being
Sent Back Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1996, at B8.
9. See generally JOHN A. GABLE, THE BuLL MOOSE YEARS: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
PROGRESsIvE PARTY (1978).
10. Theodore Roosevelt came closest in 1912, when he received 27.4% of the popular vote and
88 electoral votes from six states. Id. at 132-33. As the Supreme Court noted in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 98 n.132 (1976), Roosevelt's Progressive Party threat to the major parties ended four
years later when it rejoined the Republican Party to support candidate Charles Evans Hughes. Also,
except for 1912, the major parties have outpolled all "third parties" since 1856. GABLE, supra note 9,
at 132-33.
11. Like Roosevelt, former Vice President Henry A. Wallace ran under the banner of the Progres-
sive Party. Then Governor Strom Thurmond formed the States Rights Democratic Party as the vehicle
for his 1948 presidential bid.
12. See NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE at ix-x (rev. ed. 1981) (refer-
ring to the 1968 election).
13. Compare Ross Perot's Party: Caught Short, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21-27, 1995, at 31 ("In the
1992 election, . . . Mr Perot . . . split the Republican vote, letting Bill Clinton win California and
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is not an idle question. Democratic President Bill Clinton was elected with a 43 per-
cent plurality of the popular vote but 69 percent of the electoral votes.
Observers of the American political scene attribute the recent increase in third-
party candidacies to trends that might be expected to continue, potentially with greater
impact than at any time since 1912. One factor that has contributed to the increase in
third-party candidacies is the growing disillusionment with American government. This
disillusionment is manifested in numerous ways, including a weakening of internal
party discipline within the two-party system.14 Another factor is the communications
revolution. Beginning with the first televised presidential debate in 1960 between Sena-
tor John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M. Nixon, the number and diversity
of information sources has increased, along with the propensity of voters to make up
their own minds about the candidates. This has further contributed to the major politi-
cal parties' reduced influence. 5 If these trends continue, more competitive third-party
candidacies are likely to emerge. Yet most observers also agree that the two-party
system, combined with fixed terms for national officers, is what has given the United
States political stability compared to other polities such as Italy. 6
Each time a serious independent or third-party candidate runs for President, at-
tention turns to the electoral college. Under Article II and the Twelfth and Twenty-
third Amendments to the Constitution, each of the states and the District of Columbia
has a number of presidential electors equal to its total number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives. 7 These electors cast the ballots that, when counted, elect the President and
Vice President. Although most electors vote for the presidential and vice presidential
candidates who received a majority or plurality of their states' popular vote, electors
occasionally vote for other candidates or even non-candidates. In fact, electors have
failed to vote for their party's presidential candidate in seven of the last twelve elec-
tions, and in six of the eight elections between 1948 and 1976."8 While none of these
thus clinch the presidency for the Democrats.") with Letter from Gary Langer, Senior Polling Analyst,
ABC News, to the Editor, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11-17, 1995, at 10 ("Mr Perot took more votes from Mr
Clinton than from George Bush in California (and nationally).") and Posner, supra note 3 ("[Elxit
polling showed that Perot hurt both parties almost equally, taking roughly the same number of votes
from Clinton as he did from Bush.").
14. See generally DAVID S. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER: THE FAILURE OF POLITICS IN AMERICA
(1972); Michael Kelly, Uninvited Guests, THE NEW YORKER, March 11, 1996, at 58. Cf. ALExANDER
M. BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PAR-
TY SYSTEM 42-43 (1971).
15. See generally LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY
IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1995).
16. See KAARE STROM, MINORITY GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY RULE 153-54, 160-63 (1990).
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. Current-
ly the number of state electors ranges from three (corresponding to two senators and one representa-
tive) for the six least populous states and the District of Columbia to fifty-four for California.
18. In 1820, the New Hampshire Democratic-Republican elector voted for John Quincy Adams
instead of the party nominee. In 1948, Preston Parks, a Truman elector in Tennessee, voted for Gover-
nor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, presidential nominee of the States Rights Democratic Party. In
1956, W.F. Turner, a Stevenson elector in Alabama, voted for a local judge, Walter E. Jones. In 1960,
Henry D. Irwin, a Nixon elector in Oklahoma, voted for Sen. Harry F. Byrd, a Virginia DemocraL Six
out of eleven Alabama Democratic electors, who had declared themselves as uncommitted prior to the
election, also cast their votes for Sen. Byrd rather than Kennedy. In 1968, Lloyd Bailey, a Nixon
elector in North Carolina, voted for the American Independent Party candidate, Governor George C.
Wallace. In 1972, Roger L. McBride, a Nixon elector in Virginia, voted for the Libertarian Party
candidate, John Hospers. In 1976, a Washington State elector voted for Ronald Reagan rather than for
Gerald Ford, the Republican Party's presidential nominee. In 1988, Margarette Leach, a Democratic
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votes have affected any election's outcome, the presence of respected independent or
third-party candidates who offer attractive personal or policy alternatives could result
in an increasing number of "faithless electors"' 9 who disregard their party commit-
ments when presented with an opportunity to play "king or queen maker."'2
Of more substantial concern is that the electors' votes might be indecisive and
throw the President's election to the House of Representatives (and/or the Vice
President's election to the Senate)." The Constitution and Twelfth Amendment pro-
elector in West Virginia, transposed the choices of her party by voting for her party's vice presidential
nominee, Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, for President and Gov. Michael Dukakis for Vice President.
19. The tradition of following the popular vote is so strong that electors who fail to do so are
traditionally called faithless electors or sometimes unfaithful, errant, rogue or defector electors. See
Denny Pilant, No-The Electoral College Should Not Be Abolished, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN
PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 216, 223 (Gary L. Rose ed., 1991). A neutral term would be preferable
given the legal controversy over elector discretion. However, given the lack of such an accepted neu-
tral term, we will use the traditional term "faithless elector" in this article. See Beverly J. Ross &
William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 13 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming Sept.
1996).
20. Other concerns, not directly relevant to the issues addressed in this article are: (1) the possi-
bility that elector voting will result in a "runner-up presidency," as when Benjamin Harrison defeated
Grover Cleveland in the electoral college in 1888; (2) the inequalities in voting power among voters
across the nation produced by the electoral system, especially in conjunction with use of the "unit
rule" (allocating all of a state's electoral votes to the winner of a plurality of its popular vote) method
of voting; and (3) the way that use of the unit rule can magnify the effects of fraud or simple mis-
takes in tabulation. All of these possibilities have been claimed to threaten the legitimacy of the presi-
dency. See generally CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION (Gary L. Rose ed., 1991).
21. Beyond the scope of this article is the thicket of issues that arise in the House and the Sen-
ate if the electoral count is inconclusive. The following is a brief summary.
Under the Twelfth Amendment a constitutional quorum of the House is a member or members from
two thirds of the states. The House votes by state, not by members. A majority of the states is neces-
sary to a choice.
The House has no applicable standing rules. What is a quorum for each state's House delegation?
What is a majority? What if a state's House delegation is tied? Each state's representatives vote by
ballot (we discuss later the constitutional meaning of "ballot."). See infra notes 201-09 and accompa-
nying text.
The House should, in a non-partisan and detached manner, adopt rules beforehand. The prospect of
the House doing so in the context of choosing a President, even if "immediately", could be construed
to permit it to do so, is horrible to contemplate. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("if no person [has a]
majority [of the electoral votes], then . . . the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by
ballot, the President." (emphasis added)). Former House Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-WA), discussing
some of these issues in a recent interview, expressed opposition to the House addressing these issues
beforehand. Gary Lee, Foley Opposes Formula For Presidential Voting; If House Should Decide, Mem-
bers Should Look at Circumstances at the Time, Speaker Says, WASH. POST, June 15, 1992, at A7.
Yet, acting beforehand would seem far preferable to waiting for a specific, politically charged context.
At the plain meaning level of the Twelfth Amendment, by contrast with the House provision, the
Senate apparently does not vote for the Vice President immediately or by ballot. This raises the ques-
tions whether and how long the Senate may wait to vote and how it will vote.
In 1980, Martin Frost addressed a memorandum to then Chair Richard Boiling (D-MO) of the House
Rules Committee on the subject: "Election of the President in the House of Representatives." Frost
discusses the foregoing and other issues. He points out that specific rules were adopted by the House
in 1801 and 1825. In both cases the galleries were closed to the public. He specifically opines that
"ballot" means secret ballot. Attached to his memorandum are outlines of proposed standing rules as
well as the 1801 and 1825 rules. Apparently no action was taken by the Committee or the House. See
Memorandum from Martin Frost to Richard Bolling, Chair, Comm. on Rules (July 1, 1980) (on file
with authors); see also, If the House Picks the President, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1992, at A22.
The authors hope to discuss these issues in detail in a later article. They are well summarized in
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION 45-55 (1992).
The House should appoint a bipartisan Select Committee to draw rules for contingency elections of
the President and should adopt such rules.
The Electoral College
vide that when no presidential candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote, the
House of Representatives elects the President. Such contingency elections occurred in
1801, 1825 and 1877. If no vice presidential candidate has a majority, the Senate elects
the Vice President. This has happened only once, in 1837. The only truly multi-candi-
date presidential race which resulted in election by the House was the election of
1824.2 Many commentators claim that this election resulted in a constitutional crisis
because the House appeared to select a President in a "back room" deal. Others, how-
ever, point out that the House election led to a backlash that paved the way for An-
drew Jackson's election four years later, thus demonstrating that the two-tiered elector-
al system does function by channeling voter dissatisfaction into political action.
A problem more likely to arise than contingency elections is the exploitation of
federal and state statutory procedures governing the electoral college for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of a close race. This problem may be especially acute when
there is a strong independent or third-party candidate. These procedures have substan-
tial potential for manipulation by someone with the determination and resources to
affect the outcome of the electoral voting. A thorough understanding of these proce-
dures is necessary to correct or minimize these risks.
Many experts have examined the electoral college and proposed drastic re-
forms.23 The most frequent proposal in recent decades is abolition of the electoral col-
lege in favor of direct popular election of the President and Vice President.24 Aboli-
22. In 1824, four presidential candidates, all members of the Democratic Party (known under
Thomas Jefferson as the Democratic-Republican or Republican party), split the electoral vote, with
percentages of the electoral vote ranging between 14% and 38%.
We do not count the 1800-01 presidential election crisis. All presidential elections prior to adoption
of the Twelfth Amendment were technically multi-candidate because the electors did not vote separate-
ly for President and Vice President. However, there were never more than two sponsoring political
parties in any of these elections, and each party intended only one of its candidates to be elected
President. See infra text accompanying notes 52-62.
23. For a sampling of scholarly attention to the electoral college, see JUDITH BEST, THE CASE
AGAINST DIRECr ELECrION OF THE PRESIDENT (1975); ROBERT H. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COL-
LEGE AND THE CONSTTrUnON (1994); PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12; Rose, supra note 20; Albert
I. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1968); Vic-
tor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section I and Its Twelfth Amendment
Restatement: Challenging Our Nation's Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Election Systems, 77
MARQ. L. REv. 210 (1994).
24. Other reforms suggested for the electoral college are: (1) to split each state's electors propor-
tionately in accordance with the popular vote, see, e.g., S.J. Res. 138, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); (2)
to allocate all but two of each state's electors by congressional district and the other two to the win-
ner of a majority of a state's popular vote, as now occurs in Maine and Nebraska, see, e.g., SJ. Res.
12, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); (3) to allocate all electors by specially drawn districts, see Rosenthal,
supra note 23, at 8; and (4) to eliminate the electors as persons and allocate the state's "electoral
vote" automatically to the state's popular vote winner, see, e.g., S.J. Res. 58, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). See also Election of the President, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amend-
ments of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 151, 160-62 (1966) (testimony of Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach); Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 31-38 (1968); NELSON W. PoLSBY &
AARON B. WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELEcTIONS: STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN ELEcTORAL POLTnCS 259
(9th ed. 1996).
Obviously, the possibility that the electors' votes could elect a President who did not receive the
largest popular vote would be reduced if all states adopted, as Maine and Nebraska have, some system
that splits each state's electoral votes between the candidates. See infra text accompanying note 98.
This would also increase the importance of each electoral vote and thus of the smaller states' votes
compared to the larger states'.
However, a proportional, district, or modified district system of allocating electors' votes would also
decrease the probability that the electoral college vote will result in persuasive majorities and would
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tion can be effected only by constitutional amendment, which requires a two-thirds
majority of each house of Congress and approval by the legislatures of three quarters
of the states.25 Most constitutional amendments subsequent to the Bill of Rights have
been adopted either to extend the franchise26 or in response to specific crises. Amend-
ments generally are not adopted to prevent hypothetical problems. Notwithstanding
the controversies about the electoral college, which have continued since passage of
the Twelfth Amendment in 1801, no subsequent proposal for its reform has succeed-
ed.2
The last serious effort to change the electoral college began in 1966 and sought
to institute direct popular presidential elections.29 In 1979, the Senate held extensive
hearings on a direct election proposal. After extended floor debate, the proposal was
defeated by a vote of 51 to 48, well short of the required two-thirds majority. ° Since
then, similar proposals have been introduced in every Congress, but none has received
serious consideration.
increase the incentive for third-party and/or independent candidates. Such changes would, therefore,
increase the possibility of an election by the House of Representatives. That possibility, in the authors'
view, is an overwhelming reason for not dividing a state's electoral vote according to the popular
vote.
If the House and Senate contingency elections were eliminated, then one would have to consider run-
offs in cases where no candidate won a majority of the popular vote cast. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 65,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 60, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 42, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 28, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 297, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1992); S.J. Res. 312, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
The history of early 19th century reform efforts is described in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1,
33-34 (1892).
25. There is an alternate procedure. If legislatures of two-thirds of the states apply to Congress to
call a national convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution, Congress probably must do
so. See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NA-
TIONAL CONVENTION 115-17 (1988); cf. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V also permits states to ratify
amendments proposed in either fashion by state conventions called for that purpose.
After passage by Congress, successful amendments generally get ratified fairly quickly. The first ten
amendments took from September 25, 1789, when they passed the Senate, to December 15, 1791,
when Virginia ratified. The Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twenty-first and
Twenty-sixth took less than a year, the Fourteenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-third and
Twenty-fifth took less than two years; and the Sixteenth, Twenty-second and Twenty-fourth took less
than four years. Only the Twenty-seventh, which was ratified in 1992, more than 202 years after adop-
tion by Congress, took a long time to be ratified.
26. The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third and Twenty-sixth Amendments, respectively, extended
the vote to male African-American former slaves, women, citizens of the District of Columbia and all
persons over the age of eighteen. The Seventeenth Amendment instituted direct popular election of
Senators and the Twenty-fourth banned the poll tax.
27. The Eleventh Amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The
Twelfth Amendment was a reaction to the presidential election crisis of 1801. The Thirteenth, Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments were direct results of the Civil War. The Twenty-fifth Amendment
concerning presidential succession responded to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Four of
the seventeen constitutional amendments adopted since the Bill of Rights have concerned the presiden-
cy: the Twelfth, the Twentieth (reduction of lame-duck presidential and congressional terms), the Twen-
ty-second (limiting a President to two terms, which might be attributed to the "crisis" created by Pres-
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt's four terms), and the Twenty-fifth (providing for presidential disabilities
and vice presidential vacancies).
28. Electoral systems tend to be quite stable everywhere. See generally AREND LIJPHART, ELEC-
TORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF TwENTY-SEVEN DEMOCRACIES, 1945-1990 (1994).
29. S.J. Res. 28, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
30. 125 CONG. REc. 17,766 (1979). For a more complete history of this proposal, see the report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Senate Joint Resolution 28, S. REP. No. 111, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-4 (1979).
The Electoral College
Since constitutional elimination or reform of the electoral college seems unlikely
to occur in the near future, in this article we choose to be analysts and improvers of
the electoral college, not defenders or attackers. While we accept the electoral college
as established by the Constitution, we make a number of proposals, most for adoption
by the states, which would strengthen the existing system. Our proposals would elimi-
nate procedural anomalies among states and gaps in the federal framework for the
electors' voting. We also recommend that Congress amend the federal election cam-
paign financing laws to cover lobbying by candidates and parties after the popular
vote. It should cover lobbying of electors, and also of Congress when counting the
electoral vote becomes material or if the presidential or vice presidential election is
thrown into the House or Senate. In addition, we make some suggestions for states that
wish to bind their electors.
In the first section of this article we review the history of the electoral college,
with a special emphasis on the assumptions made by the architects of this compromise
institution, the issues it has raised in past elections, and changes made to date. In the
second part, we set forth the electoral process from the date the popular vote is cast
until Congress counts the electoral vote. Next, we conduct a detailed analysis of feder-
al and state laws, look at each stage of the electoral process, and discuss some of the
defects. Finally, we analyze the congressional process of counting the electors' ballots
and dealing with objections to elector votes.
We conclude that a concentrated effort by the states could significantly improve
the present electoral college. Congress could also enact some important reforms. Only
one of our recommendations would require a constitutional amendment, but it should
be much less controversial than amendments abolishing or radically changing the elec-
toral college system.
II. ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE
A. Constitutional Convention
The mechanism for electing the President and Vice President was one of the last
issues decided by the 1787 Constitutional Convention. It followed the famous Connect-
icut Compromise, in which the large states were permitted to control the House of
Representatives and the small states were given influence in the Senate disproportion-
ate to their population."
To some extent, the proposals for electing the President and Vice President and
their accompanying debates reflected the same large state/small state concerns that
drove the structuring of Congress. The larger states favored direct popular election of
the chief executive or some other system that accurately reflected population distribu-
tion among the states.32 The smaller states feared they would have no significant
voice in a direct election. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina warned, "[t]he most
31. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 16.
32. Id. at 21.
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populous states by combining in favor of the same individual will be able to carry
their points."33
The Convention's Committee of Detail proposed election of the President by the
national legislature. The Committee reasoned that "the members of the national legisla-
ture-who themselves had been selected by the people and state legislatures 34 -would
certainly be in the best position to judge the qualifications of the various candi-
dates. 35 However, Roger Sherman of Connecticut declared that such an election
would deprive "the states represented in the Senate of the negative intended them in
that house."36
A proposal for election by a joint ballot of members of both houses of Congress
was also opposed by the small states. They were not mollified by Madison's argument
that this way "of voting would 'give to the largest state, compared with the smallest,
an influence as four to one only, although the population is ten to one."'37 Even the
proposal made by Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, to give each state one vote for
President in a joint session of Congress, was defeated by a vote of six states to five.38
The division among the convention delegates over these proposals also reflected
the underlying philosophical differences of the Framers-differences that would be-
come clearer in the subsequent debate over adoption of the Constitution. The argu-
ments for direct election were in part arguments for popular control of the government
and in part arguments for additional checks and balances among the various branches.
James Wilson wanted the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives to be
"chosen by direct popular mandate 'to make them as independent as possible of each
other, as well as of the states."' 39 Likewise, Gouverneur Morris warned that election
of the President by Congress would create a chief executive who was "'the mere
creature' of that body."' He feared that such an election would "be the work of in-
trigue, or cabal, and of faction: it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of
cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title of the appointment."'"
There were many practical arguments against direct election of the President.42
In addition, opponents stressed the need for a republican structure, a layer of represen-
tatives between the people and government decision-making. Elbridge Gerry stated that
"the people are uninformed and would be misled by a few designing men."'43 George
33. Id. at 16.
34. The Constitution provided for the election of Senators by the state legislatures. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 1. This was changed by the Seventeenth Amendment.
35. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 20.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id. at 16-17. TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTOR-
AL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 13-14 (1994). The total congressional delegation
of the largest state numbered twelve (ten Representatives and two Senators) and that of the smallest
three (one Representative and two Senators).
38. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 17.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id.
42. It would be impossible to take a census before the first election. The states had different
suffrage requirements. Registration and supervision of a national election would be expensive and time-
consuming. Involving the people in a national election was feared as a potential source of disturbances,
even riots, that would exacerbate regional tensions and "destabilize the republican experiment."
KURODA, supra note 37, at 9 (citing RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 32, 56-57 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911)).
43. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 21.
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Mason stated that "it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper magistrate
to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colors to a blind man ... [because the]
extent of the country renders it impossible that the people can have the requisite capac-
ity to judge ... the candidates.""
The compromise that became part of the Constitution provided that each state
would have electors equal to the number of representatives plus the number of senators
it had in Congress. No mention was made in the Convention records of the advantage
given to the small states by giving all states two senatorial counterpart electors.4
However, James Madison did write later that the presidential election provisions were
the "result of compromise between the larger and smaller states, giving to the latter the
advantage of selecting a President from the candidates, in consideration of the former
in selecting the candidates from the people." '
The Convention delegates appear to have believed their essential concession to
the small states was the provision that, if one candidate did not receive a majority of
the electoral votes, the House of Representatives, with each state having one vote,
would select the President from among the five candidates with the highest votes.'
This would have seemed crucial because the delegates believed many of the presiden-
tial electors would vote for candidates from their own state or region, throwing most
elections into the House.'
The method of appointing electors was delegated entirely to the states. The elec-
tors were to cast their ballots for two persons-the votes to be of equal weight-in the
hope that at least one of them would be a man of "continental reputation" rather than a
fellow citizen of the elector's home state.49 In fact, the drafters required that "one at
least" of the two persons the electors voted for "shall not be an inhabitant of the same
State with themselves."50 The drafters' failure to require separate votes for President
and Vice President would raise difficulties in the third and fourth elections, leading to
amendment of this provision in 1804."
B. Elections of 1788-1800
In the first presidential election, in 1788, five state legislatures (Connecticut,
New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina and Georgia) appointed electors without refer-
ence to the people. New York's legislature tried to do the same, but the two houses
44. Id.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id.
47. This number was reduced to three by the Twelfth Amendment, which also reduced to two
from three the number of candidates from which the Senate would choose the Vice President.
48. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 17. Thus, the final compromise struck a balance be-
tween those who favored popular election of the President and those who favored election by the
legislative branch. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
49. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 25.
50. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Constitution does
not, as it could have, prohibit the President and Vice President from being from the same state. By
this provision it only hopes that individual electors will not exercise their discretion parochially. But
the premise of the provision is that the electors have discretion which must in this respect, and in this
respect only, be limited.
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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argued so much that the day for voting passed, and New York lost its vote completely.
In Massachusetts the legislature let the people choose electors by district but appointed
two "at-large" electors itself. Maryland and Virginia let all their electors be elected by
the people on a district basis, while in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire the people
voted statewide for the electors using a general ticket. Rhode Island and North Caroli-
na had not yet ratified the Constitution, so they did not participate.52
The undifferentiated votes for President and Vice President under Article I were
immediately recognized as a potential problem." John Adams was a popular choice
for Vice President but was not considered presidential in 1788. The unanimous senti-
ment was to make George Washington the republic's first President. However, if all
the electors had named Adams and Washington as their choices, the election would
have been thrown into the House of Representatives. In fact, many electors cast their
second votes for candidates other than Adams, some apparently out of conviction,
others apparently out of concern that Adams' total vote not rival Washington's. 4 Ob-
viously, they thought they had the discretion to do so, and their votes were counted.
In the second election, in 1792, nine of the then fifteen states' legislatures select-
ed their presidential electors.5 In four states, the people chose the electors, while two
states divided the task between the people and the legislature.56
By 1796, partisan politics had become more pronounced. The two undifferentiat-
ed votes afforded each elector led directly to the election of a President and Vice Pres-
ident of different parties. The Federalists had a three vote majority of electors, and
Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson fell three votes short of Adams' seventy-one.
However, so many Federalist electors did not cast their second votes for the
Federalists' Thomas Pinckney that Jefferson was elected Vice President.57 Again, the
electors obviously thought they had the discretion to do so. The methods for selecting
the electors again differed widely from state to state.5"
In anticipation of the election of 1800, there was scrambling in state after state to
revise the mode for choosing electors as one party or both tried to gain an edge. For
example, to ensure that Thomas Jefferson would get all the Virginia electors, Virginia
changed its election procedure to provide for a winner-take-all statewide election, in-
stead of the district voting which had been used.59 The issue of how presidential elec-
tors would be selected in the future itself became an issue, debated by the candidates
and their parties. The Federalists in the Senate introduced a bill, eventually defeated, to
allow Congress to review the returns from electors and to accept or reject their votes,
interposing themselves between the election and the people.'
52. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 33.
53. See KURODA, supra note 37, at 33.
54. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 33; Washington received one vote from each of the 69
electors and Adams received votes from 34. U.S. SENATE, SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 1, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 961 (1993) [hereinafter SENATE MANUAL].
55. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 34.
56. Id. Washington received votes from all 132 electors, a unanimous vote of the electors appoint-
ed, while Adams received votes from 77. George Clinton, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr received
50, 4 and 1 elector votes, respectively. SENATE MANUAL, supra note 54, at 961.
57. KURODA, supra note 37, at 108. Adams received 71 electoral votes, Jefferson received 68, and
Pinckney received 59. SENATE MANUAL, supra note 54, at 962.
58. KURODA, supra note 37, at 66-72.
59. Id. at 74.
60. Id. at 73-74.
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Because the Federalists had lost the vice presidency in 1796, the Republican
electors in 1800 were afraid or unwilling to chance a similar result. The two top recipi-
ents of electoral votes that year were the Republicans' presidential and vice presiden-
tial candidates, Jefferson and Aaron Burr; both had seventy-three electoral votes. To
embarrass the Republicans, the Federalist dominated state delegations in the lame-duck
House consistently voted for Burr through thirty-five ballots over six days. 6' On the
thirty-sixth ballot, crucial Federalist representatives abstained, and Jefferson was elect-
ed President.62
C. Adoption of the Twelfth Amendment
That first House election of a President provided the impetus for the adoption of
the Twelfth Amendment, but many actual and potential problems with the presidential
election procedures had already been noted. There was widespread unhappiness with
direct selection of electors by the state legislatures. Because of the rapid development
of political parties in the states as well as nationally, the results of elector selection by
a legislature were predictable as soon as the legislature was elected, sometimes years
before the presidential election. A mechanism which the Framers had created to pro-
duce electors free from political pressure and partisan control was leading to the oppo-
site result.
63
Other unforeseen effects of organization of voting by political parties led many
to question the wisdom of the existing electoral college procedures.' The Federalists'
1796 loss of the vice presidency convinced many of the need for a constitutional
amendment requiring separate ballots for President and Vice President. The new Dem-
ocratic-Republican party was also in favor of an amendment requiring separate ballots
because of the principle of majority rule. Requiring one vote for President and one for
Vice President would keep most contests from reaching the House of Representatives,
where the votes of nine small states, with only one-fifth of the national population,
could determine the chief executive. The new party was also concerned that another
House election like that in 1800 could result in the choice of a vice presidential candi-
date or a fourth or even fifth place electoral vote recipient as the President.65
When the Democratic-Republicans, who as a result of the election of 1800 con-
trolled both the Senate and the House, drafted the Twelfth Amendment, they not only
required electors to ballot separately for President and Vice President, they also re-
duced the number of presidential candidates considered in a House contingency elec-
tion from five to three, and the number of vice presidential candidates in a Senate
contingency election from three to two. The amendment also provided for the Vice
President to act as President if the House had not chosen a President by March 4 fol-
lowing the election.'
61. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 1022-32 (1801).
62. KURODA, supra note 37, at 105.
63. Id. at 110.
64. Id. at 108.
65. Id. at 133-50.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment provides, among other
things, that if a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his
term, then the Vice President shall act as President until a President shall have qualified.
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The amendment had been approved by three quarters of the states by July 7,
1804 and governed the voting of the electors in the election that fall. Because the De-
mocratic-Republican Party dominated a large majority of the states, Jefferson was
easily reelected along with another Republican, George Clinton, as Vice President.67
No one at the Constitutional Convention or the ratification debate of the 1787
Constitution had considered the electors constitutionally or legally bound to vote in
accordance with any popular vote. Elector voting patterns immediately following adop-
tion of the Constitution substantiate this.' For example, as we have seen, in 1796 the
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans in many of the states favored second candi-
dates other than their parties' vice presidential candidates. As a consequence, only four
states' electors cast all their votes for the Federalists' two candidates, Adams and
Pinckney, and in only two states were all votes cast, for the Democratic-Republican
candidates, Jefferson and Burr. This represented a total of six states out of seventeen.
On the other hand, in the elections of 1792 and 1800, whether or not the electors
thought they were constitutionally or legally bound to vote as they were chosen, almost
all of them did so. Only one elector voted otherwise in Pennsylvania and South Caroli-
na in 1792 and in Rhode Island in 1800.
Did the enactors of the Twelfth Amendment intend to bind electors to the results
of a popular vote? On its face, the Amendment effected only three relevant changes:
(1) to provide for separate elector votes for President and Vice President; (2) to reduce
the number of candidates who could be elected President or Vice President by the
House and Senate, respectively; and (3) to provide against, the possibility of any House
deadlock that continued through the scheduled inauguration date. But at least some
people's assumptions about the process had begun to shift:
Under the Constitution electors are to vote for two persons, one of whom does not
reside in the State of the electors; but it does not require a designation of the per-
sons voted for. Wise and virtuous as were the members of the Convention, experi-
ence has shown that the mode therein adopted cannot be carried into operation; for
the people do not elect a person for an elector who, they know, does not intend to
vote for a particular person as President. Therefore, practically, the very thing is
adopted, intended by this amendment.'
D. Elections of 1876 and 1824
In the presidential election of 1876, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden received a quar-
ter of a million more popular votes than Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. The Tilden
ticket obtained 184 uncontested elector votes, just one short of the number required to
be elected. Hayes trailed with only 166 uncontested elector votes. The votes of two
groups of electors, one Democratic, the other Republican, were submitted from Louisi-
67. SENATE MANUAL, supra note 54, at 963.
68. See id. at 961-63.
69. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1289-90 (1802). The Supreme Court's opinion in Ray v. Blair, 343
U.S. 214, 228 n.15 (1952), which sustained Alabama's statutorily based elector party pledge, quotes
this 1802 statement as if it were controlling legislative history of the Twelfth Amendment, but that
Amendment was not adopted until December 1803, after much debate and change. KURODA, supra
note 37, at 118-52.
[Vol. 22:145
The Electoral College
ana, South Carolina and Florida. Oregon's Governor had certified a slate of seven
Republican and one Democratic electors.7"
Without the disputed votes, neither candidate had a majority. Democrats control-
led the House and Republicans controlled the Senate. No statute provided a resolution
for any deadlock. The Twelfth Amendment provides that "if no person have such ma-
jority," then the House shall choose the President. The lame-duck Democratic House
would presumably have elected Tilden. If the House had deadlocked and the deadlock
had continued past March 3, the lame-duck Republican Senate would have elected a
Vice President who, under the Twelfth Amendment, would have "act[ed] as President."
Prior to counting the votes, Congress created an Electoral Commission, consist-
ing of representatives, senators and Supreme Court justices, to decide the contested
electors." Following the disqualification and replacement of the sole "independent"
on the Commission, the Republicans secured an eight to seven majority. The Commis-
sion, by an eight to seven decision, recognized all contested electoral votes for Repub-
lican Hayes. The deadlock in the House and Senate upheld the Commission's decis-
ions, and Hayes was inaugurated."
The Commission's solution to the Hayes-Tilden dispute was an unconstitutional
delegation of authority by Congress. Nothing in the Constitution as amended autho-
rized the House and Senate to provide that if they could not agree on the counting of
the electoral votes, the decision of another body would bind them.73
This delegation also fails the two-part test for ascertaining unconstitutional dele-
gations of power subsequently established by the Supreme Court in Bowsher v.
Synar.74 The Electoral Count Commission included members of the judicial and legis-
lative branches. It is the province of the judiciary to determine cases and controver-
sies,75 and the separation of powers principle precludes the judiciary from intervening
in issues that are political questions. 6 The counting of electoral votes is a political
question, so long as constitutional requirements are satisfied. Therefore, the Hayes-
Tilden dispute resolution mechanism should not be viewed as an authoritative prece-
dent for an electoral system failure.77
70. Initially, eight Republicans were appointed in accordance with the popular vote. One elector
died before the date of the electors' balloting. Oregon law made no provision for alternate electors.
PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 54.
71. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227.
72. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 56.
73. See Samuel T. Spear, Counting the Electoral Votes, 15 ALBANY L.J. 156, 157-60 (1877). But
see John W. Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 POL. SC. Q. 633, 647-48 (1888).
74. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727-34 (1980) (where the Court asked, first, to which
branch of government does the delegate belong and, second, is the nature of the functions delegated
consistent).
75. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
76. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
77. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 23-74 (1951); James E.
Shaw, The Electoral College and Unstable Congressional Apportionment (1979), reprinted in Hearings
on SJ. Res. 28 Before Subcomm. on Constitution of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hearings], at 463-76. But see John W. Burgess, supra note 73, at 647-
48. Later, we will discuss how the 1876 election would have likely been resolved if the statute enact-
ed 10 years later, which is still in effect, had been enacted in 1877. See infra notes 290-300 and ac-
companying text.
Nor is Rutherford Hayes' election in 1876 a clear example of a "runner-up" or "minority-majority"
presidency. Although most histories give Tilden a popular vote percentage of 50.93 in that election,
there was widespread fraud in casting and counting votes in several states, much of it in the form of
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The only election which is arguably relevant to the problems of the electoral
college as they persist today is the election of 1824. This was a true multi-candidate
race, triggered by the rapid disintegration of the Democratic-Republican party. Briefly,
John Quincy Adams, William H. Crawford and Andrew Jackson had the three highest
numbers of electoral votes, with Jackson having received a clear plurality of the elec-
toral votes78 and probable plurality of the popular vote.79 Henry Clay, the Speaker of
the House and the candidate with the fourth highest number of votes, was instrumental
in getting the Maryland, Ohio, Kentucky, Illinois, Missouri and Louisiana delegations
to back Adams. Daniel Webster and Clay entreated the swing representative from New
York to cast his vote for Adams, thus bringing the New York delegation into the
Adams column. Adams won on the first ballot of the states in the lame-duck House.
Clay became Adams' Secretary of State. At least partly in reaction to Jackson's loss in
1824 despite his receipt of a plurality of the popular vote, Jackson won the 1828 elec-
tion overwhelmingly.
The 1824 scenario could be repeated if an independent or third-party candidate
captured just enough electoral votes to prevent either major party candidate from at-
taining a majority. Whether the third-party candidate is a regional candidate, such as
Alabama Governor George Wallace in 1968, or someone with a broad national follow-
ing such as Ross Perot in 1992, the balance of power held by the third candidate could
lead to deal-making of the kind suspected and resented by the public in 1825.
III. ELECTORAL COLLEGE PROCEDURES
The Constitution, together with a series of implementing statutes, 80 sets out the
broad framework and timing for the appointment and voting of the electoral college.
The statutes are now codified in Title 3 of the United States Code, Sections 1-17."
intimidation by white Southern Democrats against Republican freedmen. Despite such tactics, in Florida,
Louisiana and South Carolina the counts were so close that it is still uncertain who formally won the
popular vote. Without such intimidation, Hayes' popular vote would surely have exceeded Tilden's.
BEST, supra note 23, at 52-53 (citing PAUL L. HAWORTH, THE HAYES-TILDEN DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION OF 1876 (1906)).
78. Hardaway suggests that if the general ticket or unit rule system had been generally in effect
in 1824 as it is today, one of the candidates, probably Jackson, would have received an electoral vote
majority. HARDAWAY, supra note 23, at 124.
79. In fact, not all states tabulated and reported their popular vote results, so we cannot be sure
that the reported returns are an accurate measure of the popular vote in the entire country. Id.
80. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (meetings of electors and transmission of their votes
to Congress); Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 50, 2 Stat. 295 (voting by electors following changes of the
Twelfth Amendment); Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (filling of vacancies among the elec-
tors); Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227 (electoral commission); Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90,
24 Stat. 373 (elector meetings, transmission of votes and counting of electoral votes by Congress); Act
of May 29, 1928, ch. 85, 45 Stat. 945 (elector meetings and transmission of votes); Act of June 5,
1934, ch. 390, 48 Stat. 879 (conforming statutory codification to changes of Twentieth Amendment);
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, 62 Stat. 672 (1948) (codified and enacted into positive law and may
be cited as 3 U.S.C.); Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, 65 Stat. 742 (1951) (substituted Administrator of
General Services for Secretary of State as repository of extra copies of certificates of electors' votes);
Act of Oct. 4, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-389, § 2(a), 75 Stat. 820 (1961) (added definitions to include the
District of Columbia following adoption of the Twenty-Third Amendment); Act of Oct. 15, 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-497, § 107, 98 Stat. 2291 (1984) (substituted Archivist of the United States for Administra-
tor of General Services as repository of extra copies of certificates of electors' votes).
81. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 644, 62 Stat. 672.
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The number of electors equals the total combined congressional representation of each
state82 plus three electors for the District of Columbia. 3
These 538 electors are appointed in each state "in such manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct." 4 Congress may determine only the "Time" of choosing the elec-
tors. 5 Popular elections for appointing the electors are held the Tuesday after the first
Monday in November, on what is commonly known as Election Day. 6
In addition, "[tihe Congress may determine . . . the Day on which [the electors]
shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States. 87"
Congress has determined that the electors cast their votes separately for President and
Vice President on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December, in meet-
ings that are convened in each state and the District of Columbia.
Signed, sealed and certified lists of the votes are then transmitted to Congress. 9
On the 6th of January, the President of the Senate, in the presence of both houses,
opens the certificates and the votes are counted." The candidate who obtains a major-
ity of electoral votes is declared to be President. The Vice President is determined in
the same fashion. If no candidate for President receives a majority of the electoral
votes, the House of Representatives elects the President from the top three vote-
getters.9 If no candidate for Vice President receives a majority of the electoral votes,
the Senate elects the Vice President from the top two vote-getters. 2 Within this broad
framework lurk numerous unresolved issues.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Congress determines the manner of appointment of electors for
the District of Columbia. U.S. CoNST. amend. XXIII. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
85. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 1, cl. 4.
86. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
88. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1994). State laws set out the rules regarding nominating and qualifying candi-
dates for election, appointing electors, meeting times and locations, filling vacancies, quorum, balloting,
election contests and enforcement of any voting requirements. The electors cast their votes separately
for President and Vice President. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
89. 3 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1994).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). If January 6 falls on Saturday or Sunday,
joint resolutions are enacted changing this date. E.g., H.R.J. Res. 677, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).




A. From Election Day to Casting of the Electors' Votes
1. Designation of Election Day
As authorized by the Constitution,93 Congress has defined statutorily the "Time"
when the electors are appointed. "The electors of President and Vice President shall be
appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in
every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and Vice President."'94 The
statute also provides that "[wihenever any State has held an election for the purpose of
choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the
electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of
such State may direct." 5
Since the time of day for choosing electors is not set forth in the Constitution or
the federal statutes, it is governed by state law. The resulting lack of uniformity has
been criticized.' While this lack of uniformity does not inhibit the workings of the
electoral college, exercise by Congress of its authority to set a uniform time for ap-
pointing electors is a reform which would complement our recommendation about the
timing of casting of the electors' votes.97
2. Allocation of Popular Votes for Electors
Currently all states but Maine and Nebraska follow the "unit rule," under which
the state appoints all its electors from the slate that receives a plurality of the state's
popular vote.9" Some state legislatures appointed their states' electors well into the
93. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. It is not surprising that the Constitution provides discretionary
rather than mandatory authority to Congress to set a uniform date and time for choosing the electors.
In 1787, subsequent increases in population density, easy travel and instantaneous telecommunications
could not have been imagined. Cf. S. REP. No. 26, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1932) [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 26] (cites changes in communications and travel times as reasons for Twentieth Amendment,
which brought forward the beginning of the terms of the new Congress and President and Vice Presi-
dent from March to January).
94. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
95. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Congress is not expressly authorized to delegate to the states its consti-
tutional function of setting the time when electors are appointed. However, this delegation of a portion
of Congress' power to set the date for appointment of the electors appears to be constitutional. Be-
cause it involves a delegation to the state legislatures rather than to a co-equal branch of the federal
government, no separation of powers issues are implicated. Moreover, the power to determine a contin-
gent time and manner of appointment for those situations where the initial manner of appointment has
failed on the date specified by Congress could be viewed as confirming the state's exclusive constitu-
tional power to appoint.
96. 1979 Hearings, supra note 77, at 11; cf. 138 CONG. REC. 37,994 (daily ed. June 11, 1992)
(statement of Sen. Slade Gorton (R-WA) against proposal for direct popular election of the President
because of different voting times for eastern and western states).
97. Of course, a uniform time would take account of differences in time zones. Considering the
small number of electors chosen in Alaska and Hawaii, exceptions might be made for those states.
98. SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNrrED STATES, 1992, S. Doc. No. 14, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (1992).
See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 805.2 (West 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1994). In
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Virginia,
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nineteenth century. Occasionally this resulted in electors who were loyal to different
parties. This practice divided the electoral votes in New York in 1808 and 1824, and in
Delaware and Louisiana in 1824.99 Some states have permitted voters to select elec-
tors from districts.' °° This system caused the split in electoral votes in Maryland in
1804, 1808, 1812, 1824, 1828 and 1832; North Carolina in 1808; Illinois in 1824;
Maine in 1828; and New York in 1828.
By 1836, all states except South Carolina whose legislature continued to select
its electors until after the Civil War had established some system of statewide popular
election of electors. While this development minimized electoral vote splits, states in
which the names of all electors were listed on the ballot still occasionally divided their
electoral votes. The listing of all elector names required voters to vote for each indi-
vidual elector and also allowed voters to cross off names they did not like. In a close
election, electors from different parties were sometimes chosen. For example, in 1912,
eleven Progressive and two Democratic electors were chosen in California, and in 1916
seven Republican electors and one Democrat were chosen in West Virginia.' °'
The increasing use of voting machines and general ticket voting-where the pull
of a lever or the marking of an "X" casts a vote for an entire slate of electors-led to
a decline in split electoral votes.'" From the mid-1880's until recently, Maine was
the only state that did not by custom or by law use the "unit rule" in appointing elec-
tors. In Maine, two electors are determined by the statewide popular vote. The other
two are determined in accordance with the popular vote in each of Maine's two con-
gressional districts.' 3 In 1994, Nebraska adopted a similar system."
Even in states adopting the "unit rule" the potential still exists for split electoral
votes through instances of "faithless elector" votes.'"5 However, faithless elector
votes have had no effect on any election's outcome so far.
A tie in a state's popular vote also raises issues about the allocation of popular
votes to elector candidates. Only thirteen states plus the District of Columbia have
provisions dictating how to select electors if presidential candidates tie in the popular
legislation has been introduced to institute elections of presidential electors by congressional districts.
Larry Rohter, Florida is Rethinking the Way Presidents Are Elected, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1992, at
A25.
At least until 1968 Georgia required a majority vote. Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 5 n.19 (citing GA.
CODE ANN. § 34-1514 (Supp. 1967)). Georgia now requires only a plurality vote. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2-501 (Supp. 1995). The history of the unit rule, through 1892, is summarized in McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 29-33 (1892), based on the argument of counsel for plaintiffs in error. Id. at 12-
14. Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and the Electoral College,
105 YALE L.J. 935 (1996) argues that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in 1982,
raises issues about this winner-take-all rule in states where politically cohesive blocs of African-Ameri-
cans or other minorities exist.
99. CONG. QUARTERLY INc., GUIDE TO U.S. ELEcTIONs 206 (1976).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 207.
102. See id. at 206.
103. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 805.2 (West 1994).
104. NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-714 (1994). Legislation to do the same was introduced in New York
in 1993 and 1995 but has not been enacted. See S. 30571/A.5173, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. Mar. 2,
1993); S. 215, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. Jan. 4, 1995). Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, New Jersey, North Carolina and Virginia have considered similar legislation. Larry Rohter, Florida
is Rethinking the Way Presidents are Elected, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1992, at A25. For the authors'
views on these proposals, see supra, text accompanying notes 47-51.
105. See Pilant, supra note 19; Bernard Weintraub, Washington Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1989, at
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vote. Most of these states provide for decision by lottery."° If a state holds separate
lotteries for each elector, as does Nevada, 7 then the state may have an electoral vote
split. Two states require the legislature to decide by joint vote."° One state, Alabama,
allows the governor to decide."° This places the governor in an awkward position if
the state's popular vote does not coincide with her own party affiliation.
In general, the electoral college and unit rule provide decisive majorities that
lend stability to our presidential election system. Likewise, the use of a lottery to select
a slate of electors in the event of a popular vote "tie" may provide greater electoral
vote majorities. Even though popular vote ties are exceedingly rare, if the electoral
votes of a state with a popular vote tie were to provide the margin of victory in a close
presidential election, the political effect almost certainly would be destabilizing. Ac-
cordingly, we recommend that all states revise their laws to provide that in the event
of a popular vote tie, their electoral votes should be divided equally among the tied
candidates with the largest number of popular votes. If the number of tied candidates
does not divide evenly into the number of electors, the number of elector votes remain-
ing after an equal division should not be certified to Congress, and that number of
electors should not cast their ballots. " °
Recently, Victor Williams and Alison MacDonald"' suggested that an equal
protection challenge based on the Fourteenth Amendment should be made to the unit
rule for elector voting. They also suggested a similar challenge, based on the Fifth
Amendment, to House voting by state delegations in contingency elections."2
Matthew Hoffman recently argued that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in
1982,' 13 gives protected racial minorities in certain states a cause of action against
the elector unit rule."
4
As noted above, the elector unit rule has been adopted by the states by statute.
States began to adopt this winner-take-all system for presidential elections prior to the
1800-01 election."5 Its use rapidly became widespread, to give each elector's vote
more weight and to prevent small states with similar and more homogeneous politics
from capitalizing upon the divisions of political allegiance more typical in the larger
106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-304 (Michie 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1314(a)(2), (c) (1992 &
Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.062 (West 1995); IDAHO CODE § 34-1505 (1995); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18:1261 (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 208.06 (West 1992) (by coin flip); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 16.1-14-01 (1991) (by coin flip); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-24-2 (1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 20A-1-304 (1995); WIS. STAT. 5.01(4) (1986).
107. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.400 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1996).
108. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 732(2)(A) (West 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 128.080 (1980).
109. ALA. CODE § 17-19-6 (1995).
110. The selection of electors who would vote could be based on the order in which the electors'
names were originally submitted by the political parties or could be made alphabetically within each
political party's state.
111. See generally Williams & MacDonald, supra note 23.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
114. See generally Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate President: Minority Vote Dilution and
the Electoral College, 105 YALE LJ. 935 (1996).
115. Virginia and Rhode Island both used a general ticket system in 1800. KURODA, supra note
37, at 74, 94.
[Vol. 22:145
The Electoral College
states." 6 These same dynamics make state adoption of a district system for presiden-
tial elections equally unlikely today, absent a federal mandate."'
The unit rule has been declared unconstitutional for statewide officers" and
state legislatures," 9 although not for congressional elections.' 20 Presidential elec-
tions differ from state legislative and executive elections in that the Constitution is
specific in assigning power to the state legislatures to choose the "Manner" of appoint-
ment of electors.' 2' As Williams v. Rhodes'22 evidences, this does not permit the
states to eviscerate the people's right to meaningful participation in the election
process. But in a case decided very soon thereafter, the Supreme Court affirmed a
three-judge district court decision denying challenges to use of the unit rule for presi-
dential electors.'23
In Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 24 plaintiffs challenged
Virginia's use of the unit rule on three theories: (1) Article II, § 1 implicitly requires
presidential electors to be chosen in the same manner as senators and representatives,
i.e., two at-large and the rest in districts drawn by population; (2) the unit rule or gen-
eral ticket method of electing presidential electors violates the Fourteenth
Amendment's principle of one person, one vote; and (3) the general ticket system
disadvantages the voters of states with a smaller number of electors, such as Virginia,
in comparison with the voters of those states having a greater number of electors."
The three-judge court denied all claims and directed the plaintiffs to reimburse defen-
dant's costs of the action.'26 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed per curiam with-
out opinion.'27
Plaintiffs contested only the unit rule. While conceding that the presidential elec-
tors were "to exercise their own judgment '' 2 under the original plan of the Consti-
tution, plaintiffs nevertheless claimed that the electors were to be "delegates" or "rep-
resentatives" of the people, in the sense of being directly and immediately chosen by
and responsible to the people. In their first claim, plaintiffs relied primarily upon "the
parallelism drawn by the Constitution in the numerical correspondence of electors with
the State's total of Senators and Representatives [and] the requirement of varying the
number of electors as the number of Representatives change.'
29
116. Id. at 164. Virginia and Rhode Island retained, and Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania adopted, general ticket systems for the election of 1804. Id. at 164-65,
167, 169. Before that, while preparing for the 1800 elections, Massachusetts and New York, id. at 74-
75, as well as New Hampshire, id. at 95, had dropped popular election by district in favor of election
by state legislatures.
117. See Williams v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 288 F. Supp. 622, 626 (E.D. Va. 1968), affd, 393
U.S. 320 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969).
118. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1953).
119. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
120. But see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (equal protection requires congressional
districts to be drawn with populations as nearly equal as possible).
121. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, ci. 2.
122. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
123. Williams v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 288 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968), affd, 393 U.S. 320
(1969) (per curiam).
124. Williams, 288 F. Supp. at 622.
125. Id. at 624.
126. Id at 629.
127. Williams v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 320 (1969).




In making their Fourteenth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs relied upon Gray v.
Sanders,30  Wesberry v. Sanders3' and Reynolds v. Sims a2 to allege that the
general ticket system "debas[es], abridg[es] or misrepresent[s] the weight of the votes
of citizens of the United States in presidential elections." The three-judge court stated:
Actually, the system is but another form of the unit rule ....
We see nothing in the unit rule offensive to the Constitution ....
... In the selection of electors the rule does not in any way denigrate the
power of one citizen's ballot and heighten the influence of another's vote. Admit-
tedly, once the electoral slate is chosen, it speaks only for the element with the
largest number of votes. This in a sense is discrimination against the minority vot-
ers, but in a democratic society the majority must rule, unless the discrimination is
invidious. No such evil has been made manifest here. Every citizen is offered equal
suffrage and no deprivation of the franchise is suffered by anyone.'33
The court found significant the fact that the unit rule had never been rejected as un-
constitutional or unfair in the election of members of the United States House of Rep-
resentatives when two or more or all representatives must run on an at-large or state-
wide basis. "In the midst of the one-person, one-vote decisions, this practice was no-
ticed without any question of its validity." The Williams court quoted Wesberry v.
Sanders: '3
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that
Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as near-
ly as is practical one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much
as another's. This rule is followed automatically, of course, when Representatives
are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the
first 50 years of our Nation's history. 33
The Williams court also adverted to historical precedents by noting that Thomas Jeffer-
son had recommended Virginia's adoption of the unit rule for presidential elections
after Virginia had used the district method. "  A recent precedent persuasive to the
court was Congress' amendment of the federal statute relating to the election of repre-
130. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1953) (Georgia's county unit system for counting votes in statewide elec-
tions violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
131. 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (equal protection requires congressional districts to be drawn with
populations as nearly equal as possible).
132. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (dilution of vote through unequally apportioned state legislative
districts violates equal protection).
133. Williams, 288 F. Supp. at 626-27.
134. 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
135. Williams, 288 F. Supp. at 628.
136. Id. at 626.
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sentatives by districts. At a time when the one person, one vote principle was already
securely established, Congress had "expressly countenanced the election of [Represen-
tatives] from the 'State at large."'1 7
Finally, the court observed that the unit rule "appears in Article H (Twelfth
Amendment) making provision for the election of the President by the House of Rep-
resentatives when no majority is obtained in the electoral college.' 3 a
The Supreme Court's affirmance, though per curiam and summary, is a decision
on the merits.' 39 It has since been cited approvingly by the Court and followed by
other courts. It would appear to foreclose the Fourteenth Amendment claims advanced
by Williams and MacDonald, who did not cite the decision. Its effect on the proposal
by Hoffman (who also did not cite the decision) for unit rule challenges under the
Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, is less clear because that Act was enacted
pursuant to Congress' Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement powers.
For purposes of Hoffman's argument, Williams v. Virginia Board of Elections
might be analogized to Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board4" Whether a
Katzenbach v. Morgan4'-based exercise of Congress' Section 5 power to implement
the Fourteenth Amendment would trump the states' explicit (and heretofore exclusive)
authority to determine the manner of their elector appointments'42 is an open ques-
tion. 1
43
A statute eliminating the unit rule in contingency House presidential elections is
even less likely to be constitutional than one proscribing use of the general ticket for
presidential electors. The Constitution originally explicity required this method of re-
solving elector-unresolved presidential elections'" and the method was restated and
readopted in the Twelfth Amendment. The only claim that could be made against the
House state delegations voting as units must be based on Equal Protection concepts
inherent in the Fifth Amendment. 45 That amendment was nearly contemporaneous
with Article II of the 1787 Constitution. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
adopted prior to, not after, the Twelfth Amendment. Congress does not have explicit
power to enforce the Fifth Amendment by "appropriate legislation" as it does the Four-
teenth. Notwithstanding the Court's analogy in Katzenbach between Congress' power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and its power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause,'" whether or not the Fifth Amendment would be interpreted to give
Congress the power to eliminate an express provision of the 1787 Constitution is doubtful.''
137. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 2c (1995)).
138. Id. at 626.
139. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDER-
AL SYsTM, 726-34 (3d ed. 1988).
140. 360 U.S. 45 (1954) (North Carolina's English only literacy voting registration requirement is
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
141. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(e), which provides that under certain
circumstances no person is to be denied the right to vote because of inability to speak the English
language, is a valid exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment implementation powers).
142. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1.
143. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 28-29 (Powers explicitly granted to the states by the
Constitution "are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that violates
other specific provisions of the Constitution.").
144. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
145. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93-108 (1976).
146. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 650.
147. Williams and MacDonald also think a constitutional amendment would be required. Williams
Journal of Legislation
As for Senate contingency elections of the Vice President, there is no way the
procedure for such elections can be rewritten to comply with "one person, one vote" so
long as the Senate is itself not apportioned according to population. This furnishes yet
another, perhaps even stronger, reason that the Court is unlikely to disturb the constitu-
tionally prescribed House procedure.
3. Controversies Over Appointments of Electors
The resolution of controversies over the appointment of electors is a matter of
state law."'s The Constitution provides, "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number
of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Con-
gress."'49 This grants to the legislature of each state plenary and exclusive power to
decide the method of choosing electors for that state. 5 ' Each state's power to provide
how a "controversy or contest" regarding the appointment of electors is to be resolved
is also reinforced by statutory provisions regulating the counting of the electoral votes.
These provisions are embodied in the Electoral Count Act, which was enacted in reac-
tion to the Hayes-Tilden counting disputes.' Under the codification of this Act at
Section 5 of Title 3 of the United States Code, state determinations of controversies
concerning the appointment of the electors "by judicial or other methods or proce-
dures" should be made "at least six days" prior to the meeting of electors.'52 If a de-
termination is made by such time, it will be "conclusive" and will "govern in the
counting of the electoral votes" with respect to the ascertainment of the state's appoint-
ed electors.'
Section 5 does not indicate what weight Congress should accord a state's deter-
mination made after that time. In 1961, Congress deferred to the judicial determination
of an election contest in Hawaii, although the court did not adjudicate the contest until
after the meeting of the electors in that year.'54 This deference is consistent with Sec-
& MacDonald, supra note 23, at 261.
148. As we point out, infra notes 275-81 and accompanying text, only where a state has not au-
thoritatively determined a controversy as to the appointment of electors will Congress determine who
are the lawful electors.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
150. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1952); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
151. Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6, 15
(1994); see supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. There is great variety in the methods chosen by
the states for deciding such controversies. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-319 (Michie 1993) (any
candidate may petition the county board of election commissioners for a recount); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 732(2)(A) (West 1993) (if there is a tie vote for presidential electors, the legislature,
by joint ballot of the members present, shall determine which are elected).
152. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
153. Id.
154. The Republican electors were initially declared elected on November 16, 1960. The election of
the Republican electors was certified by the Acting Governor of Hawaii on November 28, 1960. De-
spite the objection of the Hawaii Attorney General, a recount was ordered to begin on December 13,
1960. Both sets of electors met on the appointed day (December 19), cast their votes for President
and Vice President, and certified their own meeting and votes. On December 30, 1960 the court decid-
ed that the Democratic electors had won the election. The newly elected Governor of Hawaii certified
the election of the Democratic electors on January 4, 1961, after he took office. This certification of
the Governor was received by Congress on January 6, 1961, the day the electoral votes were counted.
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tion 6 and also the rules of adjudication provided for Congress in Section 15 of Ti-
tle 3.'15
For the transmission of the appointed electors' names and credentials, the federal
statute sets out a tripartite procedure. First, each governor is required "to communicate
by registered mail under the seal of the State to the Archivist of the United States, a
certificate of... ascertainment of the electors appointed, setting forth the names of
such electors and the canvass or other ascertainment under the laws of [the pertinent]
State of the number of votes given or cast for each person for whose appointment any
and all votes have been given or cast."'5 6 The duty to do so arises "as soon as practi-
cable after the conclusion of the appointment of the electors in [the pertinent]
State."'' 7 Second, the executive of each state is required to deliver to its electors six
copies of the transmission certificate under the seal of the state. The duplicates of the
certified popular vote and list of electors must be' delivered to the electors on or before
the day on which they meet to cast their votes. Third, if there has been "any final
determination in a State in the manner provided for by law of a controversy or contest
concerning the appointment of all or any electors of [that] State,' ' t58 the state execu-
tive is required "to communicate under the seal of the State to the Archivist of the
United States a certificate of such determination in form and manner as the same [has]
been made."'5 9
The Archivist of the United States first must ensure that all the certificates re-
ceived from the state executives "be preserved by him for one year and shall be part of
the public records of his office and . . . be open to public inspection."'" Second, the
Archivist, "at the first meeting of Congress thereafter," is required to "transmit to the
two Houses of Congress copies in full of each and every such certificate so received at
the National Archives and Records Administration.'
6
'1
In 1967, a Mississippi District Court in Penton v. Humphrey62 reviewed the
constitutionality of this certification of electors under the federal statute and concluded
in dictum that it did not conflict with the Twelfth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 63 In that case, an adult citizen and qualified voter of Jackson County,
The Chair of the Joint Session of Congress, then Republican Vice President and defeated Republican
presidential candidate, Richard M. Nixon, had in his possession certificates for both the Republican and
Democratic electoral votes and certificates indicating that each set of electors were the lawfully chosen
electors of that state. He announced to Congress that the certificate of the Governor, dated January 4,
1961, properly and legally portrayed the facts and that, in the absence of any objection, the votes of
the Democratic electors were counted. Had the Democratic electors' votes not been counted or had the
votes of the Republican electors been counted, the outcome of the 1960 presidential election would not
have been affected. See 107 CONG. REc. 288-91 (1961).
155. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 6, 15 (1994).
156. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994).
157. Id.




162. 264 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Miss. 1967).
163. The plaintiff sought "to enjoin the appointment of presidential electors in any state by any
method which is not designed to reflect the will of the people of the state as evidenced by its popular
vote." Id. at 250. The court held that the defendants' motion to dismiss had merit on "all grounds."
Id. at 251. Since plaintiff did not establish proper in personam jurisdiction over the defendants under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f) or proper venue, the court's reasoning as to the constitutionality
of 3 U.S.C. § 6 was not essential to its holding. Id. Nevertheless, there are no other cases, and the
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Mississippi, filed an action against the United States, Hubert H. Humphrey as President
of the Senate, and the presidential electors to be appointed in the 1968 presidential
election. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the federal statute providing for the
certification of the names of electors" violated the Twelfth Amendment." s The
court said that the statute did not conflict with the Twelfth Amendment because "[tihe
former refers to the certification of the identity of the electors, [and] the latter to the
transmittal to the seat of government of the results of the electoral vote."'"
B. Balloting by the Electors
1. Meetings Provisions
The Constitution gives Congress the authority to determine the "Time" and
"Day" when the electors vote.'67 Congress has designated the first Monday after the
second Wednesday in December as the "Day" on which the electors "meet and give
their votes."'"
The Constitution requires Congress, if it exercises the authority to fix "[a] day on
which they shall give their votes," to make that day "the same throughout the United
States."'" Apparently, therefore, the Framers anticipated that prejudice could result
from electors voting on different days.
Most states, including all but one of those with 20 or more electoral votes, speci-
fy the time of day at which the electors convene. 7 ° However, the times specified for
the electors' meetings vary greatly. The earliest meetings are in the morning in the
Eastern time zone, and the latest in the mid-afternoon in the Pacific time zone. The
statutes do not specify a time by or at which the electors' ballots must be cast.
The lack of a federal provision or state coordination of the time for elector meet-
ing and balloting could lead to a "ripple" effect in the event of a national effort to
influence electors to vote contrary to the popular vote in their respective states. Unifor-
mity of time of meeting, and even more important, time of balloting, would make it
more difficult for electors to vote with knowledge of how other states' electors have
voted. Those who believe that electors should have discretion, at least in states that do
not purport to bind their voting, presumably would not favor a uniform time of meet-
court's reasoning is straightforward and convincing.
164. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994).
165. Penton, 264 F. Supp. at 251.
166. Id. at 252 n.1.
167. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 3; see supra note 93.
168. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
169. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 3. Senator Charles Pinckney, one of the two South Carolina sign-
ers of the Constitution, said of this provision that "the vote should be taken in such manner [secretly],
and on the same day, as to make it impossible for the different States to know who the Electors are
for, or for improper domestic, or, what is of much more consequence, foreign influence and gold to
interfere." 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 129 (1800).
170. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 25103 (West 1977) (the electors convene at 2:00 p.m.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 103.061 (West 1992) (by 10:00 a.m.); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 5/21-4 (1995) (by
10:00 a.m.); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 168.47 (1993) (by 2:00 p.m.); N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 12-104 (Consol.
1995) (by noon); Omno REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.39 (Anderson 1988) (by noon); 25 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3192 (1993) (by noon); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 192.006(a) (West 1986) (by 2:00 p.m.).
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ing and balloting because it would not promote the exercise of that discretion. Those
who believe electors have, or should have, no discretion should favor a uniform time,
because it reduces the possibility of elector faithlessness.
It is not clear whether Congress has authority to enact a uniform time for
electors' balloting. The Constitution uses two different words: "Time" for the popular
vote and "Day" for the electors' vote. 7 ' Canons of interpretation suggest the Framers
intended to express a difference of substance. But when Congress first determined the
"Time" of Election Day, in 1792, it fixed only a period of days. This period was to be
"within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December."'7 It was not
until 1845 that Congress fixed a given day for appointment of electors.'73 Because
the 1792 Congress included a large number of the Constitution's drafters, its early
interpretation of "Time" to mean "time period" is highly probative.
The federal statute directs the electors to meet "at such place in each State as the
legislature of such State shall direct."'74 The place of the meeting is not mentioned
by the Constitution. Each state's electors usually meet at the state capital, in a speci-
fied office such as that of the secretary of state or lieutenant governor. 7
All state laws should be revised to require the state's executive to give sufficient
prior notice to the electors and alternates of the date, time and place of the electors'
meeting. State laws should also require each elector and alternate to provide the state's
executive immediate notice of any inability or intention not to attend the meeting.
The election laws of at least the twelve largest states fail to illuminate whether or
not the electors' meetings are open to the public.'76 We favor open meetings of pub-
lic bodies generally. Therefore, we recommend that electors' meetings be subject to the
open meetings laws of all states. Here, open meetings would reduce or eliminate op-
portunities for manipulation of appointments of alternate electors, counting of ballots
and certification of the votes.
State statutes are unclear about who presides over the meeting, who determines
whether all electors are present, and who supervises the filling of vacancies when nec-
essary. Likewise, the statutes are unclear as to who supervises the counting of the bal-
lots, certification of the votes, and transmission of the certificates. Because the electors
may be associated with a different political party than sitting state officers who are
present, we believe the states should place responsibility for all these matters with the
electors themselves. Consequently, we recommend that each state's statute provide that
the first order of business at each electors' meeting be the election, from among the
electors, of a presiding officer and secretary. The secretary should have a statutory
duty to keep minutes of the meeting and file them with the state's archivist, secretary
of state or other designated keeper of public records.
171. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
172. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239.
173. Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721.
174. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
175. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-176 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-6(a) (Michie 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 20A-13-302 (1995).
176. See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 25105 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.061 (West 1992); GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-11 (1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 5/21-4 (1995); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
§ 168.47 (1995); N.J. REv. STAT. § 19:36-1 (1994); N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 12-104 (Consol. 1995); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163.210 (1995); Oino REv. CODE ANN. 3505.39 (Anderson 1988); 25 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3192 (1993); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 19 2 .006(a) (West 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-203
(Michie 1993). It is also not clear whether the "sunshine" or "open meeting" laws apply.
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2. Vacancies
Although neither explicitly authorized nor required by the Constitution," fed-
eral law provides that "[e]ach State may, by law, provide for the filling of any vacan-
cies which may occur in its college of electors when such college meets to give its
electoral vote."'7 The Constitution gives each state authority to determine the man-
ner of appointment of electors for that state. 9 Therefore, the manner of filling va-
cancies in the office of elector, the manner of appointing alternate electors, and even
the decision of whether alternates are appointed, would appear to be state issues. Sec-
tions 4 and 15 of the federal statute also recognize the filling of elector vacancies to be
a matter for the states.8 Section 15 provides in part that Congress shall count regu-
larly given votes of elector successors or substitutes ascertained by state determination
of a controversy under Section 5, if they "have been appointed to fill such vacancy in
the mode provided by the laws of the State."'' State practice at the time of the adop-
tion of the Twelfth Amendment is confirmatory. For example, in 1802 the Pennsylva-
nia legislature revised its general election law. The legislature, which was controlled by
the Pennsylvania Republican Party, provided that if any electors were absent on the
day they met to vote, the legislature could fill the vacancies by joint ballot.'82
In some states, the vacancy-filling provisions operate only if the vacancy has a
specified cause, such as death, refusal to serve or the failure to attend the electoral
meeting.'83 If a vacancy in these states is otherwise caused, such as when an elector
chooses not to vote or an elector bound by state law casts a "faithless" vote, the vacan-
cy-filling provisions may not apply.
Some states provide for alternates to fill vacancies that may be known in ad-
vance of the meeting. 4 Forty-three states permit elector vacancies to be filled by
vote of the electors present at the meeting.'85 Presumably, the electors will choose
someone they believe will vote with them. Some states actually require that replace-
ment electors must be of the same party as the winning slate. 6 These methods
would seem to reduce the likelihood that an elector would vote other than in accor-
dance with the popular vote.
177. The Constitution authorizes the states "to appoint in such manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
178. 3 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
179. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
180. 3 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15 (1994).
181. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
182. KURODA, supra note 37, at 167.
183. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-104 (Consol. 1995).
184. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.30.080 (1995).
185. Most of the 43 states require that a vacancy be filled by a majority vote of the electors
present at the meeting. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-104 (Consol. 1995). Six states-Florida, Illi-
nois, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Tennessee-make other provisions. Arizona does not have
elector vacancy provisions. In Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey and New Mexico, one way or another the
victorious state party fills or participates in filling elector vacancies. There appears to be no provision
for the filling of elector vacancies in the District of Columbia. See D.C. CODE tit. I, ch. 13. Florida's
provisions appear to create opportunities for the appointment of electors who might deviate from the
popular vote. If the vacancy occurs before the day of balloting, the Governor appoints the replacement.
But if an elector is absent from the balloting meeting, the electors appoint a replacement in the pres-
ence of the Governor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.061 (West 1992).
186. See, e.g., Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.39 (Anderson 1988).
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In some states, if the electors fail to elect a replacement elector because of a tie
vote "'87 or because the electors have not selected the replacement by a specified time,
the governor has the power to decide. Others simply empower the governor to fill all
vacancies.'" These provisions create the possibility of appointment of an elector who
may not vote in accordance with the popular vote.
State laws should include specific provisions for filling of vacancies. In In re
Corliss,18 9 one person selected by Rhode Island voters as a presidential elector was
challenged and disqualified because he failed to meet the constitutional qualifications
for the office."9 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the remaining electors
could not elect a replacement for Mr. Corliss under the Rhode Island vacancy statute
because his failure to qualify did not create a vacancy; it resulted in a failure of elec-
tion. Furthermore, Corliss' disqualification did "not result in the election of the candi-
date next in vote, but in a failure to elect" the required number of presidential electors.
The popular votes for Corliss were void, as much as if cast for one who is dead. If the
electorate voted for Corliss in ignorance of his disqualification, his presence on the
ballot must be presumed to have influenced the voters' choice of how to cast their
remaining votes.' Consequently, "the selection of an ineligible candidate, not only
rendered his election void, but in addition left one place in the electoral college un-
filled."'
State legislatures should not rely on political parties to provide for instances
where the parties' elector candidates die, are unable to vote on the appointed day or
are disqualified following the election day vote. To do so is to take a chance that one
or both political parties might not select alternates. This might leave the state without
the full number of electors to which it is entitled under the Constitution, or could result
in the splitting of the state's electoral vote if the only possible replacement appoint-
ment is of an elector from another political party, as in Oregon in 1876.'
Because the Constitution gives Congress the power to set the time for choosing
electors 94 and Congress has done so,' an issue might arise where a state simply
provides, as many do, that if a vacancy arises, the electors themselves shall fill the
vacancy when they meet." If no alternates were previously appointed, then the va-
cancy-filling electors would have been appointed on a different date from that provided
by Congress. The federal statute delegates to the state legislatures authority to appoint
electors on dates subsequent to that specified by Congress only when the state "has
held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice
187. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 208.06 (1995) (providing that the electors must appear before 9:00
a.m.).
188. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-7 (Michie 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.021(5) (West
Supp. 1996). Arizona has no provisions governing the filling of vacancies.
189. 11 R.I. 638 (1876).
190. Id. at 642-43. Corliss was a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission, a
federal office.
191. Id. at 643-44; see also Dupre v. St. Jacques, 153 A. 240, 241 (R.I. 1931); Carpenter ex rel.
Dexter v. Sprague, 119 A. 561 (R.I. 1923); Sanders v. Rice, 102 A. 914 (R.I. 1918).
192. DeCesare v. Bd. of Elections, 242 A.2d 421, 427 (R.I. 1968) (Joslin, J., dissenting).
193. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 2.
195. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
196. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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on the day prescribed by law.' 97 However, the need for alternates generally arises
when the state succeeded in making a choice of elector on the day specified by Con-
gress and that elector subsequently has become unable or unwilling to serve. This situ-
ation is not reached by the federal statutes' delegation of authority.
All state laws should provide for the filling of elector vacancies. To obviate the
constitutional and political issues, we recommend that elector alternates be chosen 'at
the same time as the slate of elector nominees. The vacancy provisions should include
mechanisms to fill vacancies that occur either before or at the electors' meeting with
alternates, and for the certification, in accordance with the federal statute,' of those
chosen to fill the vacancies. Each state law should provide that a "vacancy" will result
from an elector's resignation at any time, their absence at the time and place of the
electors' meeting, or their inability or refusal to perform the electors' duties as speci-
fied in state law. Such duties presumably would include compliance with any state
statute binding electors to follow the popular vote. Further, each state shou)d provide
that either the presiding officer or a secretary chosen from among the electors should
take a roll call of the certified electors at the start of the electors' meeting. This officer
would then ascertain whether one or more alternates must be substituted for any absent
electors. Instead, Congress could modify its delegation of authority to set the date for
choosing electors to include situations where electors are chosen but subsequently be-
come unable or unwilling to serve.
3. Balloting
At the fifty-one meetings of the appointed electors, the electors cast separate
ballots naming the President and Vice President. The word "ballot" derives from the
Renaissance or early Italian word for "little ball, ' " describing the colored balls that
voters dropped into a box to signify their wishes. Such balloting was anonymous.
When paper ballots were introduced, the ballots were cast in secret.2"u The Constitu-
tion uses the word "ballot" in only two contexts: the voting by the presidential electors
and the contingency election procedures in the House and Senate.2"' In all other elec-
tion contexts the Framers use the words "choose" or "elect," which do not imply secre-
cy. Presumably, the Framers intended the use of the word "ballot" to be equivalent to
"secret ballot."2" Certainly the lame-duck Congresses of 1801 and 1825 so interpret-
ed the instruction to ballot in contingency elections. The special rules adopted by the
House to govern those contingency elections explicitly provided for secret ballots. 3
197. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (emphasis added).
198. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
199. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 160 (2d ed. unabr. 1987).
200. See Johnson v. Clark, 25 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Tex. 1938); Brisbin v. Cleary, 1 N.W. .825
(Minn. 1879); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 143 (6th ed. 1990).
201. The word "Ballot" was used by the Framers for all three purposes in the original Constitu-
tion. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. In the Twelfth Amendment the word "ballot" was dropped in
describing the Senate contingency election procedure for Vice President. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
202. In an 1800 Senate debate, Senator Pinckney, a signer of the Constitution, said that the elec-
tors are "obliged to vote secretly." 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 129 (1800);'accord BEST, supra note 23, at
36; PEIRcE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 103-04; Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 20 n.72. In 1801 and
1825 the House presidential election proceedings in their entirety were closed to the public. See
GLENNON, supra note 21, at 48.
203. The secrecy of the balloting, both by individual representatives within each state delegation
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A secret ballot is also consistent with the federal statutory instruction, that after the
electors ballot, they count, certify, and transmit their vote.2" Counting is necessary as
a separate operation only if the vote is secret. 5 Notwithstanding this tradition, which
is preserved today in Robert's Rules of Order,°' a significant number of states have
discarded tradition and the constitutional directive of secrecy while preserving the form
of paper ballots.2" It may not be a coincidence that, among the states whose practic-
es we have been able to confirm, most of those still adhering to the secrecy of elector
ballots do not seek to bind their electors to follow the popular vote. Most of the states
which have discarded secret ballots have enacted binding statutes.2"8  C e r t a i n 1 y,
states with binding statutes may have difficulty enforcing them if the ballots are secret.
In fact, a few states with binding provisions enforce them by providing for automatic
resignation if an elector votes for anyone other than her party's candidate. 29 If the
ballot were secret, then unless the elector announced her vote, no one would know the
identity of an elector who has "automatically resigned," so a vacancy could not be
declared. We recommend that at least those states which choose not to bind their elec-
tors ensure the secrecy of their electors' ballots.
After the electors vote, they then "make distinct lists of all persons voted for as
President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes
and by the delegations once the state's vote was determined, is implicit in the procedure adopted in
1801. 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HNDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1982 (1907). The procedure was followed in 1825. Id. § 1984. Congress' understanding that
these procedures insured secrecy of all voting is explicit in the debate preceding adoption of the 1825
rules. CONG. DEB. 430, 512, 514 (1825).
204. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 (1994).
205. See Presidential Succession Between the Popular Election and the Inauguration: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
15 n.26 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 HEARINGS] (S. HRG. No. 941) (statement of Walter Dellinger, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
206. Robert's Rules of Order is explicit in separating elections by ballot from all other methods of
election. "Voting by ballot (slips of paper on which the voter marks his vote) is used when the secre-
cy of the members' vote is desired." Henry M. Roberts ROBERT'S RULES OF ORDER NEWLY REvISED
405 (9th ed. 1990) (emphasis in original).
207. In our telephone interviews with the offices of the secretaries of state of eleven states, we
found that only three, Kansas, New York and Mississippi, still employ secret ballots. The others, in-
cluding all seven states in which electors have cast faithless votes, employ open balloting, generally by
requiring the electors to sign their ballots. Supporting Memorandum on file in the office of the au-
thors.
Not only are these states not acting in accordance with the Constitution, but Ohio may be violating
its own statute. The script of Ohio's electoral college meeting provides for elector voting by ballot to
fill elector vacancies, for voting by ballot for President (but instructs each elector to sign as well as
mark the ballot), and for voting by ballot for Vice President. Proceedings of Ohio's 48th Electoral
College Meeting held December 14 [sic], 1992, at 8, 10-11 (unnumbered). The applicable Ohio statute
provides for voting by ballot, 35 OHao REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.39 (Anderson 1995). It also contains
many provisions designed to ensure generally secret balloting. Id. at §§ 3505.10, 3505.18 ("No mark
shall be made on any ballot which would in any way enable any person to identify the person who
voted such ballot."), 3505.23. Since Ohio binds its electors to follow the popular vote, id. at §
3505.40, its apparent violation of the secret ballot for presidential electors may not be material, assum-
ing the validity of its binding statute. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
The eleven-state sample was not chosen randomly, but because the eleven had a history of faithless
electors or cases involving binding of electors. Nevertheless, they constitute twenty percent of the total
number of states.
208. These include Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wash-
ington.
209. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-212 (1995).
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for each."21 The federal statute requires the electors to "make and sign six certifi-
cates of all the votes given by them... and... annex to each of the certificates one
of the lists of the electors"2 " which the governor has furnished to them. Finally, the
electors seal the certificates and certify upon each that the two lists of the votes given
for President and Vice President, respectively, are contained in the certificates.2"2
C. The Period Between Balloting and Counting the Certified Votes
Under federal law, after the electors have balloted and signed the certificates of
their votes, they "dispose of the certificates" in the following manner:
(1) They "forward by registered mail" one such certificate to the President of the
Senate, who is the Vice President of the United States at that time, at the seat of gov-
ernment.
213
(2) They deliver two copies of the certificates to the secretary of state of their
state, "one of which shall be held subject to the order of the President of the Senate,
the other to be preserved by him for one year ... open to public inspection. '21 4
(3) On the day after the balloting, they "forward by registered mail two of such
certificates ... to the Archivist of the United States... one of which [is] held subject
to the order of the President of the Senate. The other [is] preserved... for one
year... open to public inspection. 2 5
(4) They deliver the last certificate "to the judge [sic] of the district in which the
electors ... assembled."
2 6
The federal statute provides that if the electors' certificates fail to reach the Pres-
ident of the Senate or Archivist of the United States "by the fourth Wednesday in
December," which is two weeks following the balloting, "the President of the Senate
or, if he be absent from the seat of government, the Archivist of the United States
shall request by the most expeditious method available, the secretary of state of the
[pertinent] State to send up the certificate and list lodged with him."2 7 At the same
time, "the President of the Senate or if he be absent from the seat of government, the
Archivist of the United States," must "send a special messenger to the district judge in
whose custody one certificate of votes from that State has been lodged."2 8 The judge
must transmit that list by such messenger to the seat of government.1 9
Although federal law sets forth the procedure step-by-step, not all states' laws
conform. Obviously, the electors should comply with federal law, and the states
210. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see 3 U.S.C. § 8.
211. 3 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
212. Id.




217. 3 U.S.C. § 12 (1994).
218. 3 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
219. Id. If the person who has been appointed messenger to deliver the certificates of the electors'
votes to the President of the Senate neglects to perform the services required, she or he can be fined
$1,000. 3 U.S.C. § 14 (1994).
220. Certain state statutes parrot the procedure mandated by 3 U.S.C. § 11 (1994) for the disposi-
tion of certificates. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-25-105 (1995). Other state statutes, while they
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should conform their laws. Furthermore, the statute assumes there is only one federal
district judge in the district where the electors meet.22' But today all federal judicial
districts contain more than one judge. Congress should amend Title 3 to specify that, if
there is more than one judge where each state's electors meet and vote, one certificate
of the electors' votes be delivered to the Chief Judge of the Federal Judicial District.
D. Which Congress Counts the Electoral Votes?
The Act of the Continental Congress adopted on September 13, 1788 established
that the terms of the first President, Vice President, and Congress would commence on
the first Wednesday in March of 1789 following the election.222 By the Act of March
1, 1792, Congress then provided that the terms of the President and Vice President
would thereafter commence on the fourth day of March after the election.2 3 The stat-
ute also provided that Congress would meet for the purpose of counting the electoral
vote on the second Wednesday of February following an election.224
The Constitution requires Congress to assemble at least once a year, on the first
Monday in December, unless Congress appoints a different day by statute.2D In its
first 140 years, Congress observed this requirement despite the fact that, in election
years, the new Congress and President did not take office until March 4 of the suc-
ceeding year. 6 Consequently, instead of the incoming House or Senate, it was the
outgoing Congress that elected the President or Vice President, if one or the other or
both failed to obtain elector majorities.2 7
apparently attempt to copy § 11, actually distort the federal statute's instructions. For example, the Ar-
kansas statute requires the Governor to send a certificate of the electors' votes to the Secretary of
State of the United States. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-305(3) (Michie 1987). This requirement was put in
the federal statutes in 1887. See Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373. In 1951, the Administrator
of the General Services Administration of which the National Archives was then a part was substitut-
ed. Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655 § 6, 65 Stat. 711. In 1984, when the Archives were made indepen-
dent, the Archivist was substituted. Act of Oct. 19, 1984, tit. I § 107, 98 Stat. 2291. The Arkansas
provision was enacted in 1987, yet the Arkansas statute still concludes its requirement by stating "as
required by the laws of Congress." ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-305(3). When state statutes distort 3
U.S.C. § 11, the state's electors should follow the procedure for the disposition of certificates set forth
in the federal provision, as mandated by the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause, and disre-
gard the inconsistent state statutory requirements for disposing of the certificates. See U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 1, cl. 2.
221. This language was first enacted as part of the Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239, when
each federal judge was appointed to a separate district.
222. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERiCA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
452 (1987) [hereinafter CRS CONSTrTTON AND ANALYSIS]; see also Act of Mar. 1, 1792 ch. 8, §
12, 1 Stat. 241.
223. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239.
224. Id.; S. REP. No. 26, supra note 99, at 2-6, quoted in CRS CONSTrrUTION AND ANALYSIS,
supra note 222, at 1861.
225. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XX § 2.
226. S. REP. No. 26, supra note 93, at 2. These sessions of the old Congresses were popularly
described as lame-duck sessions because the members of Congress who had not been reelected for
another term were viewed as politically disabled and ineffective in their legislative functions during
this period. See THE RANDoM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1078 (2d ed. unabr.
1987).
227. S. REP. No. 26, supra note 93, at 4-5.
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The Twentieth Amendment, ratified on January 23, 1933, provides in Section 1
that the terms of the President and Vice President end at noon on the 20th of January,
the terms for Senators and Representatives end at noon on the third day of January,
"and the terms of their successors shall then begin." ' Section 2 of the Twentieth
Amendment superseded Article 1, Section 4, Clause 2 of the original Constitution by
providing that the annual assembly of Congress shall begin at noon on the third day in
January unless it appoints a different day by law. 29 The legislative history of the
Twentieth Amendment indicates that it was designed, in part, to ensure that the new
Congress elect the President and/or Vice President in the event that the electoral col-
lege failed to do so. 2 3° In 1934, Congress made two additional changes. First, it
changed the day the electors' meet to cast their ballots from the first Wednesday in
January to the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December. Second, it
changed the day Congress meets to count the electors' ballots from the second
Wednesday in February to the sixth day of January.231 Since then, these statutory
provisions have remained unchanged.
Notwithstanding the assumptions of the Twentieth Amendment's supporters, an
outgoing Congress and President still possess a great ability to affect this process.
They retain the ability to amend statutes to accelerate the voting of the electors, to
accelerate the counting of the ballots in joint session of the old Congress, and to accel-
erate the election of a President or Vice President by the lame-duck House or Senate if
the electoral college fails to produce a majority. Nothing but popular opinion would
seem to prevent such manipulative action by a political party which anticipates the loss
of its control of Congress as a result of the election.
On several occasions, recently retired Senator Claibom Pell (D-RI), at least once
joined by former Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD), introduced joint resolutions pro-
posing a Constitutional Amendment under which the terms of members of Congress
and the President would begin more promptly after the November general election."
In his statement in support of the 1983 joint resolution, Senator Pell emphasized that
the people, once they have spoken, want to see their new President (and Congress) in
office. He observed that the two and a half month delay before inauguration has be-
come a period of near paralysis during which, for example, "[a]s we learned painfully
during the close of the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980-81, foreign governments defer
dealing with a lameduck [sic] Presidential administration."" 3 He said the earlier inau-
guration would permit the incoming President to submit his own budget. He further-
more notes that, disputed elections are few and usually quickly resolved. He then de-
scribed the.evils of lameduck sessions:
The dismal lameduck session of the 97th Congress is a vivid reminder that we pay
a price for the leisurely implementation of the voters' election day mandate. The
228. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
229. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2.
230. S. REP. No. 26, supra note 93, at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 345, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1932).
231. See Act of June 5, 1934, ch. 390, §§ 6-7, 48 Stat. 879 (current version at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15
(1994)).
232. E.g., SJ. Res. 71, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); SJ. Res. 322, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992);
SJ. Res. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); SJ. Res. 71, 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1983).
233. 129 CONG. REc. 7054 (1983).
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lameduck session last December was almost a textbook example of the need to
eliminate these postelection debacles; I know my colleagues who were here will
not soon forget the all night sessions, the filibusters, and the endless parliamentary
maneuvers thwarting the will of the majority of the Member [sic] of this body.
Lameduck sessions have never provided a climate for serious consideration of
national policy; they are a contest between those who see advantages in immediate
action and those who see advantage in awaiting the arrival of newly elected Mem-
bers more favorable to their cause.24
Although Senator Pell's 1983 remarks evidenced no awareness of the implica-
tions of the proposed amendment for the contingency elections of the President and
Vice President, Senator Mathias's remarks touched on the subject:
Another constitutional reform in the making would harmonize well with this pro-
posal. Recently, I joined with Senator Pryor and many of my colleagues to sponsor
Senate Joint Resolution 17, which would abolish the electoral college and provide
for -direct election of the President. The elimination of the charade of convening the
electoral college would get rid of another justification for delaying inaugura-
tion. 5
Neither Senator acknowledged the possible arguments against accelerating the begin-
ning of -the President elect's and Vice President elect's terms such as their need to rest
from the campaign and to assemble a cabinet, a White House staff and a cadre of infe-
rior Executive Branch officers. However, advancing the terms of the newly elected
Congress would have the virtue of eliminating any possibility that a lame-duck Con-
gress and President could alter the electoral college process to their political advantage.
To us, it appears manifest that if the people have decided on a change in the political
composition of the House and Senate at the same time they vote for a President and
Vice President, then if the electors fail to reach a majority, the newly elected Congress
should elect the President and Vice President.
Consequently, we recommend that at least a portion of Senator Pell's proposed
Constitutional Amendment be adopted to provide for an accelerated meeting of the
new Congress. Each new Congress should assemble on the first Monday in December
and count the electors' ballots promptly thereafter. The electors should cast their bal-
lots on the last Monday in November. This will give the states three weeks to resolve
election contests and will provide a week for the transmittal of the electors' vote certif-
icates. We take no position on whether the terms of the President and Vice President
should be advanced as Senator Pell proposed.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 7055.
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E. How Congress Counts the Votes
1. Counting
Under the Twelfth Amendment and federal statutes, the sealed certificates are
opened before a joint session of Congress meeting in the House of Representatives.236
The President of the Senate, that is the then-Vice President of the United States, unless
the office is vacant, is the presiding officer of the joint session which is held at one
o'clock in the afternoon on January 6 succeeding each presidential election. 37 He has
the power to preserve order.23 Four members of Congress are appointed before the
session, two by each house, to act as "tellers" and handle the "certificates and papers
purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes." '239 These certificates are "opened,
presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States, beginning with the
letter A."2" The President of the Senate opens each certificate24' and the tellers
read them aloud "in the presence and hearing of the two houses."242 The tellers make
a list of the votes as they appear from the certificates.243 After a determination of the
count, the President of the Senate announces the "state of the vote" and declares "the
persons, if any, elected President and Vice President of the United States."2
Upon the reading of each certificate, the President of the Senate calls for any
objections.245 Every objection must be made in writing, must "state clearly and con-
cisely, and without argument, the ground thereof," and must be signed by at least one
senator and one representative.2" When an objection is made, received and read, the
Senate withdraws to decide upon the objection and the Speaker of the House submits it
to the House of Representatives for decision.247
The time for debate on an objection in each house is limited by statute. Each
Senator and Representative may only address the objection once for five minutes.2"
After two hours of debate, it is the duty of the presiding officer of each house to put
the main question to a vote without further debate.249 No elector votes from any other
state may be acted upon until the objection is finally resolved.' °
236. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). The seating arrangement of the joint session is set forth in 3 U.S.C. §
16 (1994).
237. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); see, e.g., S. Con. Res. 1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). However, joint
resolutions have changed the date when January 6 has fallen on a Saturday or Sunday. See, e.g.,
H.RJ. Res. 677, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
238. 3 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
239. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
240. Id.
241. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
242. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
243. Id.





248. 3 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
249. Id.; see infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
250. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); see infra text accompanying notes 264-65.
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After the houses have voted separately, they reconvene, and the presiding officer
announces the decision on the objections submitted.z" The joint session may not be
dissolved until the count of all electoral votes has been completed and the result de-
clared. 2 No recess may be taken, except when an objection has arisen regarding the
counting of the electoral votes or some other aspect of the electoral vote. 3 If this
occurs, each house may, acting separately, direct a recess of such house, but not be-
yond ten o'clock the next morning unless the next calendar day is a Sunday. 24
This statutory voting procedure has been observed since 1793,"i but was not
enacted until 1877.256 The text of the Constitution does not clearly assign the task of
counting the electoral votes. The pertinent provision, carried from the original Article
II, Section 1 to the Twelfth Amendment, states; "The President of the Senate shall, in
the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and
the Votes shall then be counted." Several nineteenth century commentators have ar-
gued about whether the passive construction used for the last phrase was meant to
assign power and responsibility for the counting to the President of the Senate or to
Congress as a whole, ignoring the possibility that the phrase means what it says and
commands that the electors' vote be counted.l 7
The first implementing statute enacted by Congress, in 1792, followed the Con-
stitution in using the passive construction.258 This statute was not amended until
1877, immediately preceding the count of the Hayes-Tilden electoral vote. The new
procedure specified the appointment of two tellers "on the part of' the Senate and the
House of Representatives who, after the certificates were opened by the President of
the Senate, would read the certificates to the assembled Congress, make lists of the
votes, and hand the final ascertainment or count back to the President of the Senate,
who would then "announce the state of the vote, and the names of the persons, if any,
elected." 9 As refined in 1887, this procedure is still in use today.2'
251. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
252. 3 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 873-74 (1793); see also 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1536, 1538-39 (1797);
Spear, supra note 73.
256. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227.
257. See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 73, at 638, 645-48; DAVID A. MCKNIGir, THE ELECTORAL
SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1878) (Chancellor Kent "presumes" that the President of the
Senate counts the votes in the absence of legislation to the contrary and Joseph Story asserts that the
question of who is empowered to count the votes is "an important one."); see generally Spear, supra
note 73.
258. "Congress shall be in session ... on the second Wednesday in February succeeding every
meeting of the electors and the said certificates [of the votes of the electors in each state], or so
many of them as shall have been received, shall then be opened, the votes counted, and the persons
who shall fill the offices of President and Vice President ascertained and declared, agreeably to the
constitution." Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 5, 1 Stat. 240; see generally Spear, supra note 73.
259. Act of Jan. 29, 1877, ch. 37, 19 Stat. 227.
Two tellers shall be previously appointed on the part of the Senate, and two on the part
of the House of Representatives, to whom shall be handed, as they are opened by the
President of the Senate, all the certificates, and papers purporting to be certificates, of
the electoral votes, which certificates and papers shall be opened, presented, and acted
upon in the alphabetical order of the States .. . ; and said tellers having then read the
same in the presence and hearing of the two houses, shall make a list of the votes as
they shall appear from the said certificates; and the votes having been ascertained and
counted as in this act provided, the result of the same shall be delivered to the President
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2. Enforcing Procedures for Debate
The procedural requirements of the current statute were enforced during the 1969
debates on an objection to North Carolina's vote.26' The Senate met in morning ses-
sion on January 6, 1969, the day the electoral votes were counted, in order to permit
more time for debate prior to the time the two hour limitation would take effect.262
Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT), Majority Leader, obtained unanimous consent that,
until the Senate proceeded to the House to count the electoral votes, the Senate would
discuss the issues which were expected to arise during the joint session.2 63 The House
of Representatives did not meet beforehand to discuss these issues.
Prior to the joint session of Congress, during the morning session of the Senate,
Senator Curtis (R-NE) inquired whether it would be possible to request unanimous
consent that all electoral votes other than those of North Carolina be counted, the re-
sult be declared and certified, and the vote in question be deferred for further delib-
erations.2 In an advisory opinion, the President pro tempore stated that under the
wording of the statute, considered in connection with the Constitution, no final declara-
tion' Of the vote can be made until after the two bodies have separately considered each
objection that might be entered. The Chair further stated that he "doubt[ed] very seri-
ously that the unanimous-consent request would be in order."2"
When the Senate withdrew from the joint session to discuss the objection to the
North Carolina vote, Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-ME) submitied a unanimous con-
sent request that, in order to allow for a full and free debate, the statutory five minutes
per senator limitation be eliminated.2" The President pro tempore stated that unani-
mous consent requests which are in conflict with statutes or even with the Constitution
can be received and entertained in the Senate,26 although the chair is not permitted
to enter any ruling that purports to pass upon the legality of a unanimous consent ag-
reement.2" The President pro tempore's different responses to these two unanimous
of the Senate, who shall thereupon announce the state of the vote, and the names of the
persons, if any, elected, which announcement shall be deemed sufficient declaration of
the persons elected .... Upon such reading of any such certificate or paper when there
shall be only one return from a State, the President of the Senate shall call for objec-
tions, if any .... When all objections so made to any vote or paper from a State
shall have been received and read, the Senate shall thereupon withdraw, and such objec-
tions shall be submitted to the Senate for its decision; and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall, in like manner, submit such objections to the House of Representa-
tives for its decision ....
Id.
260. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). Although the 1877 statute was the first to specify the appointment
of tellers from each house, the procedure had been in use since 1793 and was proposed in bills debat-
ed in Congress in early 1800, prior to that year's presidential election. See KURODA, supra note 37, at
78-81.
261. The substance of this debate on a faithless vote by a North Carolina elector is discussed in
Ross & Josephson, supra note 19.
262. 115 CONG. REc. 197-98 (1969).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 198.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 210.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 211.
[Vol. 22:145
The Electoral College
consent requests may have reflected the fact that Senator Curtis' request would have
affected the procedures of the House of Representatives sitting in joint session with the
Senate, whereas Senator Muskie's would affect only the procedures of the Senate, and
the Constitution gives to each house of Congress the exclusive power to establish the
rules of its own proceedings.2" Senator Muskie's unanimous consent agreement was
not adopted, however, because Senator Edward Brooke (R-MA) objected.2 ° .
During the Senate debate following withdrawal from the joint session, there was
only one deviation between the Senate's debate procedures and the statutory debate
time limitation. Senator Everett Dirksen (R-IL) was Minority Leader in control of time
for the Republicans. When his five minutes expired, Senator Dirksen wished to take
two minutes "on the house." He designated Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) as the
next speaker, Senator Goldwater was recognized, and Senator Dirksen then spoke on
his time. While no objection was raised, the presiding officer required Senator
Goldwater to remain on his feet while Senator Dirksen spoke."'
An interesting set of parallel parliamentary exchanges occurred in the two hous-
es. In the course of each house's debate, one member moved to table the objection to
the counting of the North Carolina vote. 2 Points of order were raised to each mo-
tion to table on the ground that the statute requires the question to be put,273 and the
presiding officer of each house ruled each motion to table not in order. 4
F. Congress' Counting of the Electors' Votes
1. Lawful Appointment Controversies
The Electoral Count Act limits congressional discretion in counting the electoral
vote by establishing a sequence of rules concerning determinations of elector legitima-
cy. 7 The act's legislative history shows that it was designed to require Congress to
accept any determination by authorized state officials of an appointment controver-
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
270. 115 CONG. REC. 211 (1969). Senator Brooke noted that elimination of the five minute limita-
tion could result in one senator using the full one hour of time allotted to the majority. He concluded
that such action would frustrate the intent of the statute. Id.
271. Id. at 223.
272. Id. (Sen. Dirksen (R-IL)); see also id. at 170 (Rep. Ford (R-MI)). Representative Ford argued
that, although the statute does impose limitations on the debate, the language of the statute does not
preclude a traditional parliamentary procedure. But see 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (no votes from any other
state may be acted upon until an objection is finally disposed of).
273. 115 CONG. REc. 223 (1969) (Sen. Kennedy (D-MA)); id. at 170 (Rep. O'Hara (D-MI)); see 3
U.S.C. § 17 (1994) (after two hours of debate, "it shall be the duty of the presiding officer of each
House to put the main question without further debate.").
274. 115 CONG. REc. 223 (1969); id. at 170.
275. Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373.
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sy.276 It also provides that Congress may act in each case specified by the statute
only by concurrent action, i.e, the two houses must vote separately and must agree.27
Congress must count electoral votes "regularly given" by electors whose appoint-
ment has been "lawfully certified" by the state executive... and from whose state
only one return has been received.279 Unless both houses of Congress determine the
votes were not "regularly given," the state's certification of the electors' appointment
is conclusive.
Section 15 of Title 3 requires that, where more than one return or paper purport-
ing to be a return has been received from a state and there has been a state determi-
nation of the controversy respecting which set of electors is lawful "in the mode pro-
vided by the laws of the State,"2 Congress must accept the state's determination of
the proper electors. However, the statute still raises the issue whether the votes to be
counted were "regularly given." This rule appears to give more conclusive effect to the
state determination of the controversy than does Section 5, which states that the state
determination will be conclusive only if made at least six days prior to the meeting of
the electors. Even if not made at least six days prior to the voting of the electors, Con-
gress is commanded to accept the state's determination of who are the appointed elec-
tors. We recommend that Congress clarify Sections 5 and 15 to make clear that any
authoritative state determination is conclusive.
Section 15 also specifies that if there develops a vacancy on the state determined
board of electors, the votes of the successors or substitutes for those electors must be
counted.
If more than one return is received by Congress from two or more state authori-
ties purporting to have made determinations of the appointment controversy, then Con-
gress must decide which determination is authorized by the state's law and may count
only votes of the electors supported by the authorized tribunal.28 ' Of course, this only
276. See HOUSE SELECT COMMITIEE ON THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, MEET-
ING OF THE ELECTORS OF PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, ETC., H.R. REP. No. 1638, 49th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1886) ("Congress having provided by this bill that State tribunals may determine what votes
are legal coming from that State, and that the two Houses shall be bound by that determination, it
will be that State's own fault if the matter is left in doubt.").
277. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). Section 15 refers four times to actions of the two houses in its provi-
sions for objections to electors or electors' votes. Each time it uses the word "concurrently." Twice it
also uses the phrase "acting separately." We believe that no substantive issue is raised, notwithstanding
the canon of statutory construction that all words in a statute must be given meaning. "Concurrently"
means "acting in conjunction." THE RANDoM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 425 (2d
ed. unabr. 1987). Concurrent resolutions of Congress are those that, unlike joint resolutions, do not
require action of the President. The two houses of Congress have no constitutional power to act to-
gether. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. Section 15 itself says, before instructing Congress on what
to do in the various eventualities, that "[wihen all objections . . . to any vote or paper from a State
shall have been . . . read, the Senate shall thereupon withdraw . . . for its decision; and the Speak-
er . . . shall, in like manner, submit such objections to the House . . . for its decision." 3 U.S.C. §
15 (1994). Section 15's penultimate sentence says, "[w]hen the two Houses have voted, they shall
immediately again meet." These directions for separate house actions apply to each set of objections,
state by state. Id.
278. See 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994).
279. "[N]o electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have been regularly given by elec-
tors whose appointment has been lawfully certified . . . from which but one return has been received
shall be rejected, but the two Houses concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that
such vote or votes have not been so regularly given by electors whose appointment has been so certi-
fied." 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (emphasis added).
280. Id.
281. Id. Again, the statute still raises the issue whether the votes to be counted were "regularly
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matters if the different state authorities reach different conclusions as to who are the
legitimate electors.
Where more than one return has been received from a state and no state determi-
nation of the appointment controversy has been made in accordance with state law,
only those "lawful" (not "regularly given") votes which the two houses concurrently
decide were cast by the "lawful electors" appointed in accordance with the laws of the
state are counted.2 ' But, if the two houses cannot agree, the executive of the state's
certification under seal of one slate determines which electors are appointed. If the two
houses disagree and the executive of the state certified the appointment of one set of
the electors, Congress must count the votes of those certified electors."3
By implication, the two houses have the power to decide concurrently, in the
absence of an authoritative state determination of an appointment controversy, that the
electors whose appointment was certified by the state's executive were not the lawful
electors of the state. In that case, the executive's certification of the elector slate is not
conclusive in determining the controversy. This is the only case in which a congres-
sional determination concerning legitimacy of electors' appointment will prevail over
that of any state authority.
Barring a situation in which two governors certify competing slates,2"4 the only
case not provided for in this detailed set of rules are where: (1) Congress receives
more than one return from a state; (2) the state executive has failed to certify the ap-
pointment of any set of electors; and either (3) there has been no state determination of
the appointment controversy and the two houses cannot agree which slate of electors is
valid under state law or (4) there have been conflicting state determinations of the
controversey and the two houses cannot agree on which state determination was the
lawful one. In either unlikely case, it would appear that the two houses of Congress
must continue meeting until they agree on which electors are the lawful electors of the
state, for "[n]o votes or papers from any other State shall be acted upon until the ob-
jections previously made to the votes or papers from any State shall have been finally
disposed of,"2 5 and the "joint meeting shall not be dissolved until the count of elec-
toral votes shall be completed and the result declared.""2 6 Nor may Congress consider




284. John W. Burgess, writing contemporaneously with the adoption of the Electoral Count Act,
said that the statute also fails to cover conflicting elector appointment certificates from two persons
claiming to be the state executive. Burgess, supra note 73, at 651. This seems a remote contingency
today, but was a real issue for the 1877 Congress, as Burgess well knew. See infra, text accompany-
ing notes 290-97.
Burgess' further contention, that rejection of any electors should reduce the required majority, id.,
ignores the explicit language of the Twelfth Amendment: "The person having the greatest number of
votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
Electors appointed." U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
285. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
286. 3 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
287. This is implicit in the demands of Title 3 of the U.S.C. §§ 15, 16 and 17. It has been the
policy followed by the presiding officer since the earliest days of the republic. In 1877, debate lasted
a month and a day, and no other business was transacted. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 55-
56.
Similarly, the Twelfth Amendment requires, and clause 3 of Article II, § I before it required, that
the House "choose immediately, by ballot, the President" if no candidate receive a majority of the
19961
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If the House and Senate cannot agree, the provisions of the Twelfth and Twenti-
eth Amendments take over.288 They provide that, if the Senate has chosen a Vice
President by the beginning of the presidential term on January 20, the Vice President
shall act as President until a President is elected by the House and qualifies, but if the
Senate also has not elected a Vice President by that time, Congress's statutory provi-
sions for presidential succession will govern.2
2. The 1876-77 Election under the Electoral Count Act
As we have seen, the Electoral Count Act was adopted to prevent another
stalemate in Congress over counting contested electoral votes such as that which led to
the unconstitutional 1877 Electoral Count Commission. Three out of four of the 1877
appointment controversies apparently would have been settled by the statute. At least
one of these three controversies would have been settled differently and would have
resulted in Tilden's election.
Congress received two sets of elector vote certificates, one from Democratic
electors and one from Republicans, for each of Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina.
In each case, early popular voting returns indicated victory by the Democrats' Tilden
but were tainted by allegations of widespread voting fraud. Republican Reconstruction
governments controlled each of these state governments, including the election machin-
ery, and rival vote certifications were submitted by the Democratic and Republican
electors in each state.
In Florida, the State Board of Canvassers and Governor certified the Republican
Hayes electors, but the state court decided that the Tilden electors had won the
state.2 ' Without carefully analyzing a full set of 1876 Florida statutes to determine
whether the State Board of Canvassers or the state court was the final authority for
purposes of determining elector appointment controversies, one cannot be certain
whether the Electoral Count Act would have changed the result of the Florida count.
However, it seems more likely that the state court determination of the controversy
would have been controlling if the Electoral Count Act had been in place, which
would have ensured Tilden's election.
electors' Vote. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONsT. amend. XII (emphasis added).
In 1801 the House interpreted this language as prohibiting its attention to any other business until a
President had been selected by the House. As a result, all business presented to the House by either
President Adams, the Senate or any other source during the six days of House voting on the election
of Jefferson and Burr was deferred until after the vote. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 1025 (1801). This inter-
pretation of the constitutional mandate appears correct. In 1825 there was only one vote by the House,
so the issue did not arise. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 51.
288. Between 1865 and 1876 the two houses of Congress had in effect a rule that would have
disqualified the returns of any state where one house of Congress objected. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra
note 12, at 54; L. Kinvin Wroth, Election Contests and the Electoral Vote, 65 DICK. L. REv. 321,
328-31 (1961).
289. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1994) provides that if there is neither a President nor a Vice President, the
House Speaker shall act as President, if he resigns as Speaker and as a Representative. If there is no
Speaker or the Speaker fails to qualify, the President pro tempore of the Senate acts as President if he
resigns both offices. If these provisions fail, the cabinet officers act in order of departmental seniority
beginning with the Secretary of State.
290. Act of Feb. 3, 1887, ch. 90, 24 Stat 373.
291. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 53-54.
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Louisiana had two sitting governments, one Democratic and one Republican.
Two canvassing boards delivered different election results to two governors who sepa-
rately certified the two different slates to Congress.292 Apparently there was no inde-
pendent "determination of the controversy" by an authorized state tribunal, so this
conflict would not have been resolved for Congress by the Electoral Count Act."3
Under the Supreme Court's opinion in Luther v. Borden,294 it is within Congress'
powers as "the political department" of the United States government to determine
what government is the established one in a state.295 Therefore, putting the interven-
tion of the Electoral Commission to one side, Congress was within its prerogative to
count the Hayes votes, implicitly determining the validity of the Republican Recon-
struction government in Louisiana.
In South Carolina, the State Board of Canvassers certified only the Republican
electors.". Consequently, Congress would have been required by the Electoral Count
Act to count the Republican votes for Hayes, as it did following the Electoral
Commission's report.29
The fourth appointment controversy arose in the state of Oregon, where the vot-
ers had elected a Republican slate. One Republican elector was a postmaster ineligible
to serve under the Constitution.298 He resigned as an elector right after the election,
but there were no alternates from which to fill the vacancy. Oregon's Republican Gov-
ernor therefore certified one Democratic elector along with the two remaining Republi-
can electors. The postmaster also resigned his position as postmaster, whereupon the
remaining Republican electors reelected him to fill his own vacancy and sent a second
set of three certified votes to Congress.2 Under the Electoral Count Act, the two
houses of Congress could have agreed to ignore the Governor's certification. However,
given the partisan split between the Senate and the House, which gave rise to the expe-
dient of the Electoral Commission, the Act likely would have required Congress to
count the Democratic vote for Tilden on the basis of the Governor's certification.'
The Commission appointed by Congress simply disregarded this certification by the
Governor despite the absence of any more authoritative state determination of the con-
troversy. Because Tilden was only one electoral vote short of an absolute majority of
the total electoral vote, that one Oregon vote would have guaranteed his election.
292. Id. at 54.
293. See supra note 284.
294. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
295. Id. at 42.
296. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 53.
297. Id.
298. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
.299.. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 12, at 53-54. Despite the differences in the electoral vote
count that would have resulted' from greater congressional deference to state resolutions of these ap-
pointment controversies, the decision to elect Hayes is still considered appropriate by some scholars.
The widespread intimidation of African-Americans by white voters in the South is thought to have
lowered Hayes' popular vote in all the disputed states more than enough to account for Tilden's ap-
parent popular vote victory. See BEST, supra note 23, at 24-25, 53.
300. See supra text accompanying note 283.
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3. Votes "Regularly Given"
We now reach the most vexatious question concerning Congress' counting of the
electors' votes: what does it mean that Congress may assert the power to count only
elector votes which are "regularly given?" As we have seen, Section 15 refers four
times to counting elector votes "regularly given" and once to counting "lawful votes."
The legislative history deals inconclusively with distinctions Congress may have in-
tended by these two terms. We discuss "regularly given" in our separate article on
elector discretion.3°'
G. Campaign Finance Regulation for Electors' and House and Senate Votes
According to author James Michener, after their respective 1968 and 1976 de-
feats, presidential and vice presidential candidates Hubert H. Humphrey and Robert
Dole both said that "had the results been closer they would, the morning after the
election, have gone seeking Presidential electors whom they might divert from the
winning side to vote for the apparent losers, converting them into winners.""
Human nature suggests that if the electors' votes are going to be close, candi-
dates and their parties will be strongly tempted to campaign for them. Yet, it appears
that the giving of the votes of the electors, the counting of the electors' votes by Con-
gress, and any contingency elections in the House and Senate are not elections for
purposes of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act 3°3 or the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971' (hereinafter "Campaign Acts"). Thus, no public financing
would be available as candidates and their parties try to influence the votes of the
electors, the counting of their ballots at the joint session of Congress, or any votes of
the House and Senate for President or Vice President, respectively. Nor would contri-
butions to or expenditures by candidates, political committees, or parties be disclosed
or regulated.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as codified and amended (the "FEC
Act"), defines a "contribution" to include "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or
deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influ-
encing any election for Federal office ... ."' The word "election" is defined by the
FEC Act to mean:
(A) a general, special, primary or runoff election;
(B) a convention or caucus of a political party which has authority to nominate a
candidate;
(C) a primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating
convention of a political party; or
301. Ross & Josephson, supra note 19.
302. 1979 Hearings supra note 77, at 74.
303. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-13 (1994).
304. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (1994).
305. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, §301, 86 Stat. 3,11-12 (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (1994)) (emphasis added).
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(D) a primary election held for the expression of a preference for the nomination of
individuals for election to the office of President.'
The voting by the electors or by the House and Senate in choosing the President and
Vice President are not any of the above.
Similarly, Section 9002 of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act defines
the term "presidential election" to mean "the election of presidential and vice-presiden-
tial electors."'" Thus, the voting by the electors themselves or by the House and
Senate is not covered.
The FEC Act and Presidential Electors and Political Activities Act were amended
and codified in section 591(a) of Title 18 of the United States Code, entitled Elections
and Political Activities. Both before and after 1972, and until its repeal in 1980,"
this section had almost identical effects.
This conclusion of inapplicability is confirmed by the legislative histories of both
Campaign Acts. References too numerous to cite to "voters" make it clear that Con-
gress was concerned with voting by citizens, not the constitutional balloting by elec-
tors, let alone by Representatives or Senators, none of whom are ever mentioned in the
legislative history.
This conclusion is also confirmed by the relevant regulations of the Federal Elec-
tions Commission (FEC). Neither the constitutional balloting of the electors, the deter-
mination of their credentials, nor the counting of their votes by Congress are a primary
or runoff election, caucus or convention. The FEC defines "general election" as either
"(1) [a]n election held in even numbered years on the Tuesday following the first Mon-
day in November .... [or,] (2) An election which is held to fill a vacancy in a Federal
office (i.e., a special election) . . . .""3 By law, the electors "meet and give their
votes on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December... ,,3o and the
electoral votes are counted on the next January 6." For this reason, paragraph (1) is
inapplicable. Paragraph (2) is inapplicable on its face.
That post-general election actions are not elections is also confirmed by the regu-
lations which provide that contributions or expenditures with respect to a recount or
election contest are not contributions or expenditures for purposes of the regulat-
ions." 2 Finally, the FEC makes no effort to regulate the expenditures of electors, un-
like those of convention delegates.
33
Despite the apparently clear exclusion of electors' voting from each of these
relevant statutes or regulations, the FEC in May 1993 initiated a Matter Under Review
(MUR) regarding expenditures by the 1988 Dukakis for President Campaign for legal
services in connection with elector issues. The FEC asserted that the law firm and
lawyers who provided such services thereby made campaign contributions subject to
regulation under the FEC Act.3 4
306. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, §301, 86 Stat. 3, 11 (cbdified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §431(1) (1994)) (emphasis added).
307. 26 U.S.C. § 9002 (10) (1994) (emphasis added).
308. Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 301(a), 93 Stat. 1339, 1368 (1980).
309. 11 C.F.R. § 100.2(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
310. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
311. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
312. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(20), 100.8(b)(2) (1995).
313. Id. § 110.14.
314. FEC MUR 3449, May 4, 1993, May 7, 1993 21 FEC Record No. 10, at 4 (Oct. 1995). One
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In November 1994, a partner in the law firm and the chair of the Democratic
National Committee's advisory lawyers group submitted a petition to the FEC for the
issuance of a rule-making on the issue." 5 In their petition, they pointed out the fac-
tors that make campaigns for elector votes and for congressional votes in the event of
a contingency election likely. Especially significant are third-party presidential candi-
dacies and the ambiguity and lack of uniformity of laws governing electors' votes for
President and Vice President. The FEC did not include any recommendation for con-
gressional action on these issues in its February 2, 1995 legislative action recommen-
dations to the President.
In a May 1995 letter, the FEC informed the law firm that the Commission would
take no further action against the firm. The following month, the FEC revised its regu-
lations governing public financing of presidential primary and general election candi-
dates. 1 6 At that time the Commission announced that it had decided to address the
electoral college issues raised by the petitioners in a separate rule-making proce-
dure.3 The FEC has now made the MUR public."'
At least one Senator has addressed this issue. In 1992, then Senator Alan
Cranston (D-CA) introduced a bill to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 to expand the definition of general elections to include the electoral college and
House and Senate presidential elections.3"9 No counterpart was introduced in the
House. The bill was not the subject of any hearings, and there have been no subseq-
uent legislative developments.
Such campaign regulation should be within Congress' authority. The Supreme
Court has upheld Congress' regulation, through the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925,320 of political committees that sought to influence the election of presidential
and vice-presidential electors in two or more states.32 Challengers to the regulation
maintained that, because "the power of appointment of presidential electors [is] exp-
ressly committed by Section 1, Article II, of the Constitution to the states," '322 con-
gressional involvement beyond that expressly sanctioned by the Constitution to deter-
mine "the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their
votes ' is unconstitutional. The Court disagreed. It reasoned that Congress had not,
in purpose or effect, interfered with the states' powers to appoint electors and deter-
mine the manner of appointment. Furthermore, the statute regulated only political com-
of the authors of this article was a partner and the other was an associate in that law firm-and, with
others affiliated with that law firm, provided those legal services. The Dukakis/Bentsen Committee, Inc.
responded in a letter dated June 3, 1993 to the Chairman of the Commission making essentially the
arguments set out in this section of this article. A complete description of the MUR 3449 procedure
and a full set of the materials produced in the matter are on file at the offices of the authors.
315. Rulemaking petition: Notice of Availability, 59 Fed. Reg. 63,274 (1994).
316. Public Financing of Presidential Primary and General Election Candidates, 60 Fed. Reg. 31,854
(1995).
317. Id.
318. See 21 FEC Record No. 10, at 4 (Oct. 1995); Notice of Disposition of Petition for Rule-
Making, Electoral College Expenditures, 60 Fed. Reg. 56,268 (1995).
319. S. 2876, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
320. Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1053, 1070, repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972).
321. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544 (1934). Burroughs was cited approvingly in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 n.16 (1976).
322. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544.
323. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
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mittees which, because of their interstate reach, could not be regulated adequately by
the states." 4 The Court concluded "[the statute] in no sense invades any exclusive
state power.'"
The lack of regulation in this area cries for a remedy. Since the Federal Election
Commission has not acted and may not have the power to act, Congress should do so
promptly.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Have we, in the process of preparing this article, reached a view about the reten-
tion, modification or elimination of the electors? We have. In more than two hundred
years, defects of the electoral system have only three times-in 1801, 1825 and
1877-been a substantive factor in choosing a President, and only once, in 1837, a
Vice President. The Twelfth Amendment remedied the defect that led to the crisis of
1801. The electoral commission that gave rise to the reconstruction compromise of
1877 almost certainly was unconstitutional and hopefully will not be repeated. The
impetus for the commission was the divided Congress, but the procedural statute enact-
ed ten years later, still in effect in substantially the same form in Title 3 of the United
States Code, was another giant step towards making sure that what happened in 1876
and 1877 will not happen again.326
The college appears to have one major and one minor advantage over any alter-
native. The major advantage is its tendency, especially when combined with use of the
general ticket and "unit rule," to marginalize third parties and exert a moderating influ-
ence on the political delegates of the two predominant parties.3" The minor, but po-
tentially crucial, advantage is the safety valve of elector discretion, if only to respond
to events between election day and the casting of the electors' ballots. This safety
valve has, thankfully, been needed only once,32s but would be difficult to replace.329
324. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544.
325. Id. at 545.
326. See supra notes 290-300 and accompanying text.
327. BEST, supra note 23, at 204, 206-07; HARDAWAY, supra note 23, at 122; JAMES A.
REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1992). But see
RICHARD L. BURRILL, CONTROvERsY OVER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL SYSTEM (1975) (argues that
the present system encourages splinter groups that wish to control the balance of power in the elector-
al college); Hoffman, supra note 98.
328. Candidate Horace Greeley died in 1872 between the election and the casting of the electors'
votes. Most of his electors scattered their votes among other candidates. Congress refused to count the
votes of the three who voted for Greeley anyway. BEST, supra note 23, at 175-76. President Taft's
Vice President and nunning mate, James S. Sherman, died on October 30, 1912, before the electoral
college had met. Since Taft was not reelected, however, the exercise of elector discretion was not
material to the outcome. Id. at 176.
329. The Twentieth Amendment specifies in § 3 what happens if a President elect dies or falls to
qualify or has not been chosen by the beginning of the term. It also authorizes Congress to provide
by law for the case where neither a President elect nor Vice President elect has qualified. In § 4 Con-
gress is authorized to provide by law for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the
House or Senate must select a President or Vice President in the event of a contingency election.
The legislative history of the Twentieth Amendment makes clear that a person becomes President
elect or Vice President elect when the electors, not the voters, cast their ballots. H.R. REP. NO. 345,
supra note 195, at 2-3. The House report uses the term "President elect" to refer only to the period
after the electors have voted, and observes that "Presidential electors, and not the President are chosen
at the November election." Id. at 5. It further observes that should a nominee die before election day
or between election day and the electors' vote, no further constitutional provision is necessary because
the "electors ...would be free to choose a President." Id. at 5. The conference committee adopted
the language and policy of the House provision on the President elect. H.R. REP. No. 633, 72d Cong.,
Journal of Legislation
On the other hand, the laws we have examined present numerous opportunities
for disorder and disruption. Many elements present the obvious potential for manipula-
tion: elector meetings not subject to open meetings laws, elector meetings run by a
state official of a different party than the elected slate of electors, electors voting by
secret or open ballot (depending upon the political atmosphere and incentives provided
for "faithless" votes), uncertainty regarding the filling of elector vacancies, an unlikely
but statistically possible tie in the popular vote of a state, lack of any regulation of
campaigns for elector votes especially in states where electors are not bound and dif-
ferences in the times at which different states' electors cast their votes. In a highly
competitive three or two-party race, these statutory issues could permit determined
candidates possessing ample resources many opportunities to affect the election of our
chief executive.
Most of these issues would be eliminated by elimination of the electors them-
selves. But the current two-tier structure for presidential elections has served the coun-
try well to date. As we have shown, only the election of 1824-25 is a precedent for
any likely problems we face with the electoral college today. Attempts to significantly
change the workings of the elector system or to inaugurate direct election of the Presi-
dent and Vice President have repeatedly failed. There is no reason to believe another
such attempt will succeed any time soon.
The college's defects can be ameliorated substantially by adoption of the recom-
mendations in this article. We hope the states and Congress will act. We encourage the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to take the lead and draft a model act for the
states.330
We summarize the recommendations we have made as follows:
1. Alternates for presidential electors should be nominated by the political parties
when they select elector candidates and be elected by popular vote on election day.33'
2. A designated state officer should give notice to elector nominees and alter-
nates of their nomination and of any statements they must file with the state.
3. A designated state officer should give advance written notice to the electors
and alternates of the date, time and specific place of the electors' meeting.332
4. Each elector and alternate should be required to provide, on the day before the
electors' meeting, written notice to the designated state officer that he or she will at-
tend the meeting.333
5. The electors' meeting should be subject to each state's open meetings law, and
if no such law exists, the meeting should be made open to the public by specific stat-
ute.
334
1st Sess. 4 (1932). But see Akhil R. Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents and Death: Closing the
Constitution's Succession Gap 48 ARK. L. REv. 215 (1995).
In 1994, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution held a hearing relating
to the death of a President-designate between the general election and the inauguration. No bill was
before the Committee, none appears to have been introduced, and the Committee seems not to have
reported on this subject. See 1994 HEARINGS, supra note 205, at 1.
330. We recognize that some states may need to amend their constitutions as well.
331. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
332. See supra text following note 175.
333. See supra text following note 175.
334. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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6. A presiding officer and secretary should be elected by the electors with statu-
tory duties, including filing minutes of the electors' meeting with the state archivist or
other appropriate officer.33
7. A roll call of the electors and alternates present at the electors' meeting should
be taken either by the secretary or presiding officer.
33 6
8. All states should have vacancy provisions, including mechanisms for filling
vacancies before and at the electors' meeting, and for the certification of those chosen
to fill the vacancies. Should the vacancy occur prior to the electors' meeting, the va-
cancy should be filled by the alternates in the order named on the ballot. If the vacan-
cy occurs at the electors' meeting, the vacancy should be filled from the alternates
present, either in the order named on the ballot or alphabetically by last name. As soon
as a vacancy is filled, the governor should certify the new elector(s) as provided by
federal law.337
9. A "vacancy" should result from an elector's resignation, absence at the
electors' meeting, or inability at any time to perform the elector's duties for any
cause.
338
10. If the presidential candidates with the largest number of popular votes tie, the
electoral vote should be split between the tied candidates. If the number of tied candi-
dates does not divide evenly into the number of electors, the number of elector votes
remaining after an equal division among the tied candidates should not be certified or
counted.339
11. Where state law is inconsistent with Title 3 of the United States Code, state
law should be amended to conform with Title 3.34
12. At the least, states that choose to bind their electors to follow the popular
vote should adopt uniform times for the casting of their ballots. Having a uniform time
would, to some degree, remove the danger of a "ripple" effect of elector defec-
tions.
13. States that choose to bind their electors should release them in the event the
presidential or vice presidential candidate to whom they are committed dies, resigns,
becomes disabled, or is otherwise judged unfit for the office between election day and
the time the electors vote.342
14. States that choose not to bind their electors should ensure the secrecy of their
electors' ballots.343
We recommend that Congress amend Title 3 of the United States Code as fol-
lows:
1. Although the constitutional authority for Congress to appoint a uniform time
throughout the United States for choosing electors is not clear, if Congress is con-
335. See supra text preceding note 177.
336. See supra text following note 198.
337. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
339. See supra text following note 198.
340. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
341. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
342. See Ross & Josephson. supra note 19.
343. See supra notes 199-212 and accompanying text.
192 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 22:145
cerned about a "ripple effect" on election day, it should designate a uniform time peri-
od for voting that takes into account the different time zones in the country.3" : ;
2. Until such time as all states have adopted our recommendation to require the
political parties to select and place on the ballot alternate electors at the same time as
the main elector candidates, Congress should broaden its statutory delegation of author-
ity to the states for setting the time for choosing the electors. In addition to the author-
ity now granted, this expanded provision should authorize the states to appoint electors
on a date subsequent to that specified by Congress whenever one or more of the elec-
tors chosen by the state on the date specified has died, resigned, or been otherwise
disqualified.345
3. If Congress believes that electors should follow the popular vote, then Section
7 should provide a uniform time for convening states' electors' meetings and their
balloting. Congress may also decide, as we have,3" that binding electors is an issue
that should be left to the states, consistent with the constitutional policy of leaving the
appointment of electors to each state. However, those who believe electors should be
bound would gain comfort from establishing a uniform time for electors' balloting.
347
4. Section 5, concerning state determinations of controversies or contests involv-
ing the appointment of electors, should be amended so that any state determination is
conclusive and will govern the counting of the electoral votes by Congress. Currently,
this is provided in Section 15, but the states should continue to be encouraged to re-
solve such controversies prior to the electors' meeting as provided in the present Sec-
tion 5.3"
5. Section 11 should specify that one certificate of the electors' votes be deliv-
ered to the Chief or Acting Chief Judge of the Federal Judicial District where the
state's electors' meeting took place.349
6. Congress should also amend Section 7 of Title 3 to move the date on which
the electors vote to the last Monday in November. Assuming adoption of the Constitu-
tional amendment we recommend in the last paragraph of this section, Congress should
amend Section 15 of Title 3 to change its counting of the electoral votes to a day in
the first full week of December and Section 1 of Title 2 so that its own terms com-
mence on the first Monday in December following each election.350
Other desirable federal statutory amendments concern campaign contribution
disclosure and campaign financing contribution and expenditure laws. The present laws
do not apply to the electors' balloting, to the counting of the electors' votes by Con-
gress, or to the election of a President by the House or of a Vice President by the
Senate. This is a serious gap. If the popular vote and the workings of the electoral col-
lege do not decisively elect a President and Vice President, we may expect the candi-
dates and their parties to lobby the electors and Congress vigorously. Congress should
consider whether public financing should be available for these purposes. It should
344. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
345. See supra text accompanying note 183 and accompanying and following notes 194-198.
346. See Ross & Josephson, supra note 19.
347. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
348. See discussion supra part 1I.A.3 and text accompanying notes 275-80.
349. See discussion supra part ll.C
350. See supra notes 222-35 and accompanying text.
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certainly require disclosure of contributions and expenditures for these purposes and
regulate them if constitutionally possible.35" '
Our sole recommendation for constitutional reform stems from our concern about
House election of a President. The Twentieth Amendment took a giant step forward by
reducing the possibility that a lame-duck House or Senate could elect the President or
Vice President if the electors' vote does not. That possibility remains if the outgoing
Congress and President enact a law to bring forward the times of the electors' casting
and/or Congress' counting of their votes. This risk could be reduced or eliminated by a
constitutional amendment making the term of the newly elected Congress start earlier
than January of the next year.352
351. See discussion supra part II.G. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (deciding the consti-
tutionality of various provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971).
352. See discussion supra part lI.D.

